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PURPOSE  OF  REPORT  
The  report  provides  GM  Local  Authorities  with  an  update  on  the  Greater  Manchester  Green  
Deal  Communities  Programme  and  with  relevant  reference  details  for  post  programme.  
RECOMMENDATIONS    
GM  LAs  are  asked  to:  
•   Review  this  paper  and  its  contents,  and  to  store  the  relevant  framework  partner  
contact  details  for  any  future  customer  queries.  
  
  
1.  BACKGROUND    
  
In  late  2014  DECC/BEIS  awarded  the  Association  of  Greater  Manchester  Authorities  
(AGMA)  with  the  largest  Green  Deal  Communities  budget  (£6.1M),  and  largest  national  
target  for  delivery  (1,205  households  to  receive  measures  predominantly  external  wall  
insulation).    
  
Initially  over  27  LAs  and  combined  authorities  were  nationally  awarded  DECC/BEIS  GDC  
funds,  mid-­way  through  the  project  only  19  LAs/combined  authorities  still  remained,  (the  
others  struggled  and  dropped  out),  out  of  those  remaining  we  are  the  lead  nationally,  and  
the  only  body  to  have  completed.    
  
Greater  Manchester  bolstered  the  original  DECC/BEIS  funding  with  additional  funds:  £1.2M  
total  Customer  Contribution,  £948K  Local  Authority  contribution  and  £589.1K  of  ECO  funds,  
making  the  net  worth  of  this  project  £8.8M.    
  
Greater  Manchester  completed  delivery  of  the  project  before  the  deadline,  31st  March  2016,  
with  1,302  households  receiving  measures  (predominantly  external  wall  insulation);;  97  
additional  households  receiving  measures  all  within  budget.  We  were  the  first  to  meet  the  
DECC/BEIS  Green  Deal  Community  Household  Sign  Up  Target  and  the  first  (and  only  body  
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2.  DELIVERY  OF  GM  GREEN  DEAL  COMMUNITES  PROGRAMME  
  
a)   Initial  obstacles:    
Green  Deal  has  received  much  negative  PR.  With  this  negative  publicity  and  industry  
apathy,  it  was  very  difficult  at  the  start  of  the  Greater  Manchester  Green  Deal  Communities  
project  to  get  Green  Deal  Communities  underway,  a  concept  developed  by  DECC/BEIS  
aimed  to  kick  start  Green  Deal.  In  Greater  Manchester,  we  utilised  the  Green  Deal  
Communities  funding  to  assist  fuel  poor  residents,  in  the  private  owner  occupied  and  private  
rented  sector,  with  energy  efficiency  measures  for  hard  to  treat  elements,  predominantly  
through  external  wall  insulation  (EWI).  The  private  sector,  in  the  past,  has  often  been  
neglected  when  it  comes  to  external  wall  insulation,  with  the  majority  of  EWI  schemes,  
focused  on  social  housing.    
  
Overall  Marketing:  customer  engagement  and  marketing  was  kept  simple,  both  for  the  
residents  and  the  local  installers,  as  at  the  time  the  project  started  there  were  conflicting  
national  offers  available  such  as  Home  Improvement  Fund  (HIF).  Set  up  of  such  a  large  
scale  project,  legalities,  data  sharing  etc.  also  meant  that  we  encountered  initial  delays.    
  
During  delivery  of  this  project  we  have  seen  all  our  10  LAs  undertake  staff  reductions.  The  
Greater  Manchester  team  also  disbanded  the  Greater  Manchester  Energy  Advice  Service  
which  was  in  existence  at  the  start  of  the  project,    mid-­way  during  the  project,  leaving  one  full  
time  and  one  partime  officer.  We  have  seen  small  SMEs  who  have  been  working  on  the  
project  enter  into  Administration.  Through  the  programme  framework  we  were  able  to  assist  
a  few  such  companies  and  prevent  them  from  entering  into  Administration  e.g.  by  advance  
payment.  
  
b)   Technical  Advancements:    
This  project  has  enabled  technical  innovative  advancement  in  Greater  Manchester.  Working  
with  the  University  of  Salford  and  a  local  SME,  RED,  a  pattern  book  has  been  produced.  
This  is  an  extensive  online  catalogue  of  different  types  of  domestic  retrofit  measures,  
(including  those  used  on  this  project)  and  details  around  them  e.g.  types  of  suitable  
materials,  access  to  these  materials,  advantages  of  specific  methods  of  installs  etc.  We  have  
also  learnt  from  undertaking  this  project  and  technical  workshops  have  been  held  to  share  
this  learning  in  Greater  Manchester  with  key  stakeholders,  local  SMEs,  contractors  and  local  
authorities.  Etc.  This  learning  has  also  been  shared  with  DECC/BEIS  and  the  Core  Cities  
group  (a  national  group  made  up  local  authorities).  
  
Through  this  project  we  have  also  delivered  external  wall  insulation  on  a  whole,  owner  
occupied,  park  homes  estate  (+20  park  homes);;  this  is  a  first  in  Greater  Manchester.  The  
project  was  well  received  and  has  significantly  benefited  the  fuel  poor  residents.  In  addition  
the  programme  has  worked  on  retrofitting  an  array  of  complex  solid  wall  properties  including  
steel  framed  and  tinned  wall  properties,  homes  that  have  extremely  low  thermal  comfort.  The  
project  has  used  innovative  energy  efficiency  materials  e.g.  on  homes  at  risk  of  flood.  This  
learning  is  can  be  used  for  future  schemes  in  Greater  Manchester.    
  
The  University  of  Salford  is  monitoring  a  select  few  households  to  enable  a  better  
understanding  of  the  impact  of  these  energy  efficiency  works  on  these  households.  Once  
this  evidence  is  collated,  it  will  be  shared  local  and  nationally  (through  DECC/BEIS,  Core  
Cities,  and  Public  Health  England)  to  enable  better  learning  of  such  measures.    
  
c)   Using  local  SMEs  and  third  sector  groups:  
This  project  has  provided  work  for  small  local  SMEs  who  have  been  contracted  to  be  the  
installers  as  well  as  deliver  customer  engagement.  Local  charities  and  community  groups  
have  also  been  used  for  customer  engagement,  behavioural  change  advice  programmes  
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etc.  Local  venues  and  community  buildings  have  been  hired.  This  project  has  greatly  helped  
to  increase  local  community  cohesion  and  bolster  the  local  economy.  
  
d)   Customer  financial  contribution:  
Residents  who  provided  a  financial  contribution  towards  the  works  were  assisted  with  




3.  PROGRAMME  OUTCOMES  
  
•   The  majority  of  the  1,302  residents  assisted  through  this  programme  are  low  income,  
vulnerable,  fuel  poor  households  in  Greater  Manchester  (Bolton,  Bury,  Manchester,  
Oldham,  Rochdale,  Salford,  Stockport,  Tameside,  Trafford  and  Wigan).  They  have  
been  assisted  through  energy  efficiency  measures,  predominantly  external  wall  
insulation,  as  well  as  behavioural  change  advice  and  energy  efficiency  advice.  For  a  
full  break  down  of  these  installs  please  see  Annex  1.  
  
•   On  average  we  are  seeing  approximately  £350pa  savings  on  resident  fuel  bills.    
  
•   Estimated  quantity  of  carbon/energy  saved  per  year  through  this  project  in  Greater  
Manchester:  12000	  MtCO2e	  (or	  1.2M  kg).  
  
•   GM  have  received  very  positive  feedback  from  residents  since  installation  of  the  
energy  efficiency  works  including:  improvement  in  their  thermal  comfort,  a  better  
understanding  of  their  energy  usage,  a  visual  improvement  to  their  home  from  the  
outside  and  their  street  looking  better  visually,  community  atmosphere  improved  with  
the  area  being  visually  rejuvenated  and  neighbours  interacting  with  each  other  
benefit.    
  
•   The  project  has  delivered  a    holistic  approach,  e.g.  coordination  of  use  of  other  
services/works  for  the  residents  which  has  added  to  the  overall  impact  of  the  energy  
efficiency  project,  e.g.  additional  home  repair  works  e.g.  roof  repairs,  security  and  
safety  advice  through  fire  and  police  visits,  community  led/  and  council  led  street  
clean  ups,  community  led  events  and  activities.  Some  Councils  (e.g.  Rochdale)  
through  this  programme  have  also  provided  residents  with  an  easy  to  read  handbook  
detailing  the  works  and  energy  efficiency  tips  etc.    
  
  
4.  EVALUATION  STUDY  BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  SALFORD    
  
The  University  of  Salford  conducted  an  evaluation  of  the  programme.  A  questionnaire  was  
sent  to  all  residents  who  had  been  involved  in  the  programme  and  had  received  energy  
efficiency  home  improvements;;  181  residents  completed  and  returned  the  questionnaire.  
The  feedback  from  the  survey  has  been  very  positive:  over  80%  found  the  works  to  be  value  
for  money,  88%  found  the  energy  efficiency  works  had  a  positive  impact  on  their  property.  
77%  of  those  who  responded  to  the  questionnaire  found  the  quality  of  final  works  good/very-­
good.  Only  16%  of  respondents  found  the  quality  to  be  below  ‘good’  i.e.  fair,  7%  responded  
with  poor  (we  liaised  with  the  University  to  obtain  contact  details  for  these  residents;;  
however  these  residents  wished  to  remain  anonymous).  77%  found  the  quality  of  handover  
information  good/very-­good.    
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5.  NATIONAL  COMPARISON  
  
The  national  deadline  set  by  DECC/BEIS  to  complete  this  programme  was  31st  March  2016.  
GM  met  this  deadline  and  were  the  only  body  in  the  county  to  do  so.  To  review  how  our  
project  compares  nationally  in  May  2016,  please  see  Annex  2  (Supporting  document,  source  
DECC/BEIS:  Zillah  Boraston,  Home  Energy,  Zillah.Boraston@DECC/BEIS.gsi.gov.uk).    
  
  
6.  GOING  FORWARD  
  
a)   Data  
All  final  data  has  now  been  submitted  to  DECC  and  all  DECC  data  queries  have  been  dealt  
with.  As  an  LA  if  you  wish  to  access  data  specific  to  your  LA  (some  of  you  have  already  
done  so,  e.g.  Salford,  Oldham)  please  contact  Amy  Decourcy:  
(amy.decourcy@rochdale.gov.uk)  by  17th  October  2016  with  your  request.    
  
b)   Green  Deal  Community  Queries  
The  programme  has  now  officially  closed.    
i.   For  Customer  Queries:  Please  see  Annex  3.  
ii.   Local  Authority  Officer  Queries:  
•   Keepmoat  relevant  query:  ian.stone@keepmoat.com  Tel:  0161  876  6000  
•   Willmott  Dixon:  Steve.Preston@willmottdixon.co.uk  Tel:  01462  476610  or  07811  
991574  
•   Wates:  Gary.Baxter@wates.co.uk  Tel:  0161  946  8800  
•   Demo  Homes:    University  of  Salford,  Professor  Will  Swan,  w.c.swan@salford.ac.uk    
Tel:  0161  295  2585  Mob:  07876  580  189  
  
c)   Final  Reports  
i.   For  the  Customer  Survey  Outline  Report  by  the  University  of  Salford  please  see  
Annex  4.  
ii.   For  the  Evaluation  report  by  Dr  Graeme  Sherriff,  University  of  Salford  please  see  
Annex  5.  
iii.   Following  closure  of  project  finances  AGMA  are  in  the  process  of  submitting  a  final  
report  to  DECC/BEIS.  This  report  will  be  made  public  upon  approval  from  
DECC/BEIS.  
  
d)   Greater  Manchester  Green  Deal  and  ECO  Framework  
The  OJUE  procured  framework  is  still  active  and  available  for  GM  authorities  to  use.  At  
present  the  framework  is  being  used  to  deliver  (£2M  ring  fenced  for  GM)  ECO  measures  
(boilers  and  insulation)  to  low  income  homeowners  and  private  tenants,  this  current  ECO  
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Annex  1:    
TABLE  1:  Completed  GDC  installs  per  LA.      
	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   Local	  Authority	   EWI	   Soft	   Total	  
	  	   Bolton	   155	   14	   169	  
	  	   Bury	   29	   59	   88	  
	  	   Manchester	   79	   54	   133	  
	  	   Oldham	   121	   2	   123	  
	  	   Rochdale	   218	   252	   470	  
	  	   Salford	   37	   0	   37	  
	  	   Stockport	   22	   2	   24	  
	  	   Tameside	   71	   9	   80	  
	  	   Trafford	   8	   9	   17	  
	  	   Wigan	   154	   7	   161	  
	  	   Total	   894	   408	   1302	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
EWI:  External  Wall  Insulation  













	   	   	   	  
6	  
	  
TABLE  2:  Households  receiving  more  than  one  measure  (a  second  measure  was  not  
counted  towards  our  number  of  household  target):  








EWI	  with	  1	  
Soft	  
Measure	  
EWI	  with	  x2	  
Soft	  
Measure	  









	  	   Bolton	   2	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
	  	   Bury	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
	  	   Manchester	   2	   2	   0	   2	   1	  
	  	   Oldham	   0	   0	   0	   0	   2	  
	  	   Rochdale	   0	   0	   0	   30	   4	  
	  	   Salford	   1	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
	  	   Stockport	   22	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
	  	   Tameside	   4	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
	  	   Trafford	   1	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
	  	   Wigan	   57	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
	  	   Total	  	   89	   2	   0	   32	   7	  
  
EWI:  External  Wall  Insulation  
Soft:  Measures  such  as:  loft,  cavity  wall,  room  in  roof  insulation;;  boiler  installs.    
     




Greater  Manchester  GDC  Project:  
How  Greater  Manchester’s  GDC  project  compares  nationally  in  May  2016:  
We  are  the  only  body  to  have  completed  the  project.  The  national  DECC  deadline  to  
complete  was  31st  March  2016,  we  had  completed  in  March  2016.    
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Annex  3:  Response  sheet  for  customer  query  
Greater  Manchester  Green  Deal  Communities  Resident  Enquiries  
Thank  you  for  your  enquiry.  The  Greater  Manchester  Green  Deal  Communities  programme  
has  now  completed.  If  you  wish  to  contact  your  installer  please  see  the  below  information.  
In  all  instances,  where  viable,  please  refer  to  your  customer  reference  number,  providing  
your  name,  address  and  brief  details  of  the  works  that  you  received,  e.g.  boiler  replacement,  
external  wall  insulation  etc.  Thank  you.  
  






Please  note  Bolton  residents  from  the  Slatersfield  area  please  contact  Bolton  Council  
directly  and  not  Keepmoat.      
  














Telephone:  Helpdesk  0845  389  9563  Office  Hours  /  0800  
2888  200  OOH  
  Email:  bcnwcallcentre@keepmoat.com  
Wates  
  Telephone:    Customer  Care  0800  0141  372  
Email  Address:  Customercare.Livingspacewest@wates.co.uk  
Webpage/website  address:  www.wates.co.uk  
Willmott  Dixon  Energy  Services  Limited  
  Steve  Preston,  Operations  Manager.  Telephone:  01462  476610  or  07811  
991574  
Email  Address:  Steve.Preston@willmottdixon.co.uk  




     
Greater Manchester  
Green Deal Communities 
Consumer Survey Outline Report 
 
 
Prepared by the  
Applied Buildings and Energy Research Group 
 School of Built Environment 
University of Salford 
 








     






Greater  Manchester  Combined  Authority  (GMCA)  secured  £6.1M  from  DECC  to  deliver  a  
Green  Deal  Communities  Programme.  The  scheme  was  delivered  by  Greater  Manchester's  
Green  Deal  and  ECO  Framework  Partners.  GMCA  were  the  first  in  the  country  to  meet  
DECC's  target  on  the  programme,  and  exceed  it  within  budget.  Over  1,240  GM  households  
received  energy  efficiency  measures,  over  900  of  these  properties  received  external  wall  
insulation  through  the  programme.  
  
As  part  of  the  work  undertaken  it  was  identified  that  an  understanding  of  the  customer  
experience  would  be  helpful  in  the  further  development  of  retrofit  programmes  within  GM.  As  
this  was  not  part  of  the  initial  scope  of  works,  the  study  undertaken  was  designed  to  be  a  
“light  touch”  to  gain  a  broad  understanding  of  the  customer  experience  covering  the  process  
from  initial  contact  to  post-­handover.  
  
This  report  highlights  a  summary  of  the  main  findings  from  183  of  the  properties  within  the  
Green  Deal  Communities  Programme,  from  a  total  sample  of  1240.  This  report  provides  the  
headline  analysis,  providing  a  descriptive  overview  of  the  data.    
  
The  survey  was  undertaken  between  January  and  April  2016  and  administered  by  the  
University  of  Salford  Applied  Buildings  and  Energy  Research  Group  (ABERG).    
  
     





The  questionnaire  was  developed  by  the  GM  Green  Deal  Communities  with  the  University  of  
Salford  as  an  added  value  exercise  to  attempt  to  understand  the  occupant  experience  of  the  
retrofit  installations  delivered  under  the  programme.  
  
An  on-­line  questionnaire  was  developed  looking  at  the  following  key  areas  through  a  total  of  
17  core  questions;;  
  
•   Location  of  the  property  –  to  enable  the  identification  of  delivery  partner.  
•   Marketing  channels  that  drove  the  decision  making  process.  
•   Decisions  making  of  the  occupant  in  terms  of  reasons  to  go  ahead.  
•   The  Green  Deal  Assessment  process  and  offer  to  customers.  
•   The  construction  process  in  terms  of  customer  experience.  
•   The  occupant  view  of  the  post-­construction  period.  
•   The  occupant  view  of  the  delivered  retrofit  and  its  benefits.  
  
The  questionnaire  was  delivered  with  a  mixture  of  paper  and  on-­line  approaches,  due  to  
some  occupants  being  identified  as  having  limited  access  to  the  Internet.  All  partners  were  
provided  with  a  link  and  a  paper  version,  which  was  then  uploaded  to  the  main  site.  It  was  
determined  that  individuals  should  not  have  to  identify  their  tenure  as  this  may  lead  to  clear  
identification  in  some  areas,  which  was  considered  undesirable  –  however  the  options  to  
provide  this  information  was  made  available.  
  
The  data  was  anonymous,  but  in  some  cases  individuals  volunteered  their  details  for  follow  
up  studies.  The  project  followed  the  University  of  Salford  ethical  procedures.    
  
2.1  About  the  Sample  
  
The  overall  response  rate  was  approximately  14.8%.  The  local  authorities  and  construction  
partners,  depending  on  the  authority,  recruited  the  sample.  It  is  identified  from  the  responses  
from  the  different  authorities  that  only  those  who  had  active  local  authority  partners  engaged  
with  the  process  fully.  This  means  that  there  is  a  clear  skew  towards  those  areas  where  
there  is  an  active  local  authority  role  within  the  delivery  of  the  project  (Figure  1).  This  is  
particularly  prevalent  in  Wigan  (47%  of  responses)  and  Rochdale  (17%  of  responses).  
Where  construction  partners  were  the  predominant  means  of  data  collection,  the  responses  
are  generally  lower.  
  





Figure  1  –  Responses  by  Local  Authority  Area  
  
In  addition  to  understanding  the  location  of  the  property,  we  were  also  interested  in  the  
current  knowledge  that  the  participants  felt  they  had  in  terms  of  energy  efficiency  and  their  
homes  (Figure  2).  
  
  
Figure  2  –  Responses  by  level  of  energy  efficiency  knowledge  
  
While  this  is  self  reported  and  can  be  subject  to  some  positive  self  reporting,  it  does  tend  to  
indicate  that  the  participants,  on  the  whole,  considered  themselves  to  have  good  or  very  
good  knowledge  with  regards  to  energy  efficiency  (77%).  This  does  potentially  indicate  that  
early  adopters  of  retrofit  will  be  inclined  to  have  higher  levels  of  understanding  of  the  issues  
associated  with  their  properties  energy  consumption.  
  
     





The  following  section  addresses  the  main  findings  that  cover  the  period  from  initial  
engagement,  and  the  decision-­making  behind  their  choices,  through  to  the  post-­occupancy  
period  and  considerations  of  outcomes.  
  
3.1  Marketing  and  Engagement  
  
In  terms  of  marketing  and  engagement  the  first  question  identified  the  key  channels  that  
were  used  to  find  out  about  the  Green  Deal  Communities  Programme  (Figure  3).  By  far  the  
most  common  method  was  direct  mail  (36.6%).  This  was  defined  as  a  letter  directly  
addressed  to  the  occupant.  Other  mail  driven  approaches,  which  were  not  directly  targeted  
at  a  named  occupant  such  as  printed  media  were  also  relatively  successful  (16%).  The  other  
most  successful  method  was  through  door  canvassers  (25.1%).  
  
Other  methods,  such  as  phone  (2.3%),  internet  and  social  media  (3.4%),  press  (2.3%),  
referral  agencies  (1.7%)  and  events  (1.7%),  were  deemed  to  be  less  successful.  However,  
friends  and  family  as  an  informal  channel  did  have  some  impact  (11.4%)  
  
  
Figure  3  –  Main  Channels  to  find  out  about  GDC  
  
This  does  have  some  implications  for  future  working  on  projects  of  this  type.  While  some  of  
the  other  channels  are  cheaper,  it  does  seem  that  direct  named  contact  and  “boots  on  the  
ground”  are  the  most  effective.  The  role  of  friends  and  family  is  also  interesting  as  this  does  
show  the  impact  that  reputational  issues  may  have.  




In  making  the  decision  to  engage  with  the  programme  (Figure  4)  it  is  clear  that  energy  




Figure  4  –  Main  reasons  for  choosing  to  have  improvements.  
  
The  comments  supporting  this  question  highlighted  that  some  owners,  including  one  landlord  
wanted  to  improve  the  quality  of  the  home,  while  two  social  housing  residents  identified  that  
they  were  not  part  of  the  decision  making  process.  
  
  
3.2  Green  Deal  Assessment  Process  
  
Generally,  the  respondents  felt  that  getting  a  Green  Deal  Assessment  for  their  homes  was  
very  easy  (31%)  or  easy  (54%),  as  shown  in  Figure  5.  This  is  a  positive  response  in  terms  of  
the  processes  that  were  established  to  ensure  communication  with  occupants  was  well  
managed,  with  only  7%  feeling  that  there  were  difficulties.  This  does  still  identify  that  for  
future  programmes,  this  process  still  needs  close  management.  
  
     
Figure  5  –  Ease  of  getting  a  Green  Deal  Assessment  
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Once  the  assessment  was  delivered,  the  respondents  were  asked  how  easy  the  found  it  to  
understand  (Figure  6).  83%  found  it  easy  or  very  easy,  with  5%  finding  it  difficult.  This  was  
generally  considered  positive  –  this  may  well  align  with  the  fact  that  many  individuals  felt  
confident  they  understood  energy  efficiency  issues.  
  
  
Figure  6  –  Ease  of  understanding  the  Green  Deal  Assessment  
  
This  data  should  be  considered  in  light  of  external  studies  to  see  if  there  is  any  difference  
between  previous  studies  and  these  current  findings,  which  suggest  a  positive  view  of  
access  to  the  information  in  the  assessment.  
  
In  terms  of  the  available  options,  the  respondents  were  asked  if  they  would  have  liked  
improvements  that  were  not  available  to  them  under  the  programme.  30%  stated  that  they  
would  have  liked  additional  improvements.  When  asked  to  comment  the  following  themes  in  
the  responses  were  identified.  
  
•   There  was  a  clear  demand  for  doors  and  windows  to  be  included  in  the  process.  
•   Boilers  were  often  requested.  
•   Additional  non-­energy  related  improvements  were  also  often  requested  –  these  were  
often  maintenance  issues  or  corrective  work.  
  
There  is  potentially  an  opportunity  for  occupants  to  have  other  works  done  while  their  energy  
improvement  work  is  undertaken.  Maintenance  issues  are  a  particularly  important  area;;  
where  flexibility  to  have  additional  works  done  may  be  beneficial  to  the  occupant  and  the  
builder  in  terms  of  additional  works  that  might  be  carried  out  while  on  site.  This  could  
suggest  some  more  flexibility  in  future  programmes  that  allow  individuals  to  wrap  other  
unfunded  work  within  programmes.  
  
In  terms  of  clarity  of  pricing  83%  of  respondents  found  the  pricing  clear,  with  a  further  9%  
identifying  the  costing  as  fairly  clear.  However,  this  does  indicate  that  a  small  minority  (8.1%)  
did  not  find  the  costing  clear.  The  reasons  for  this  are  not  picked  up  in  the  survey  –  the  issue  
may  be  contractor  led,  or  indicate  issues  on  the  part  of  the  householder.  




3.3  Construction  Process  
  
During  the  construction  period  the  respondents  were  asked  a  series  of  questions  related  to  
their  engagement  with  the  contractor  (Figure  7).  The  first  of  these  questions  concerns  
communication  with  the  contractor  about  the  project.  
  
  
Figure  7  –  Quality  of  communication  with  contractor  about  project  
  
While  52%  of  people  felt  that  this  was  good  or  very  good,  a  significant  number  felt  that  is  
was  fair  (34%)  or  poor/very  poor  (15%)  –  this  is  possibly  driven  by  the  nature  of  the  
contractor  and  their  associated  supply  chains  who  had  less  experience  in  the  domestic  
setting  and  were  therefore  more  used  to  dealing  with  social  housing  asset  managers.  This  
data  would  need  additional  analysis  to  identify  the  connection  between  this  issue  and  tenure.  
  
This  pattern  is  also  repeated  in  the  question  with  regards  to  concerning  information  related  
to  the  improvements  (Figure  8).  
  
  
Figure  8  –  Quality  of  communication  about  improvements  
  
Again,  this  was  felt  to  be  an  issue  with  the  tenure  that  many  organisations  involved  in  
delivery  were  used  to  working  in  as  social  housing  generally  has  less  need  for  direct  
communication  with  clients,  a  role  often  taken  by  the  housing  provider.  




In  terms  of  disruption  (figure  9),  it  was  generally  viewed  as  very  low  (21.5%),  low  (28.8%)  or  
fair  (39%).  This  is  probably  reflective  of  the  nature  of  the  work  undertaken,  with  very  little  
work  substantively  taking  place  within  the  home  for  long  period  of  time.  Further  analysis  
would  be  required  to  better  understand  the  implications  of  disruption.  
  
  
Figure  9  –  Level  of  perceived  disruption  
  
Overall,  there  appears  to  be  some  issues  around  communication  with  the  occupant.  The  
picture  is  not  poor  overall,  but  indicates  that  some  improvements  in  practice  could  allow  the  
process  to  be  managed  more  effectively.  
  
3.4  Post-­Construction  and  Handover  
  
The  post-­construction  and  handover  period  looked  to  establish  the  view  of  the  customer  in  
terms  of  the  quality  of  the  work  and  support  during  the  handover  period.  
  
In  terms  of  the  quality  of  work  (Figure  10),  77.3%  of  the  respondents  rated  the  work  is  good  
or  very  good,  while  6.8%  rated  the  quality  of  the  work  as  poor  or  very  poor.  Without  direct  
observation  of  the  sites  it  is  difficult  to  establish  the  reasons  for  this,  however,  it  does  
indicate  that  there  are  issues  in  a  small  number  of  properties.    
  
  
Figure  10  –  Quality  of  final  construction  




In  terms  of  the  provision  of  handover  information,  the  respondents  rated  this  process  as  
shown  in  Figure  11.  77.3%  of  the  respondents  identified  that  this  was  good  or  very  good.  
There  is  a  minority  of  respondents  (6.8%)  who  felt  it  was  poor  or  very  poor.  
  
  
Figure  11  –  Quality  of  handover  information  
  
While,  this  does  not  seem  large,  it  does  present  an  opportunity  for  better  understanding  
handover  and  considering  this  process  in  more  detail.  
  
In  response  to  post-­completion  support  from  the  contractor,  as  shown  in  Figure  12,  the  
responses  are  more  varied.  While  50%  felt  they  had  good  or  very  good  service,  there  is  a  
significant  minority  (20%)  who  had  poor  or  very  poor  service.  As  with  handover,  this  does  
indicate  that  service  standards  after  completion  are  an  opportunity  for  development.  
  
  
Figure  12  –  Post  completion  support  from  contractor  
  
Overall,  while  the  issues  of  post-­completion  support  do  not  tell  a  particularly  bad  story,  bit  it  
is  clear  there  are  issues  for  a  number  of  households  that  have  not  been  well  supported.  How  
retrofit  is  supported  after  completion  remains  an  issue  worthy  of  some  further  consideration.  
  
3.5  Customer  Outcomes  




Consumer  outcomes  are  the  category  of  questions  that  deal  with  the  respondents  view  of  
the  delivered  retrofit.  The  first  question  addresses  value  for  money  (Figure  13).  
  
  
Figure  13  –  Value  for  money  
  
Overall,  the  view  was  that  the  improvements  did  generally  provide  value  for  money  for  80%  
of  the  respondents.  However,  an  examination  of  comments  does  indicate  that  the  level  of  
subsidy  provided  did  drive  many  of  these  responses.  Where  people  did  not  feel  it  was  value  
for  money,  it  usually  was  driven  by  issues  of  quality  of  work  or  issues  of  engagement  with  
the  contractor.  
  
The  next  question  was  concerned  with  whether  the  respondents  felt  the  retrofit  of  the  
property  had  a  positive  or  negative  impact  (Figure  14).  
  
  
Figure  14  –  Impact  on  property  
  
Here  88.4%  of  respondents  felt  that  the  impact  was  positive  or  very  positive.  A  small  number  
felt  the  improvements  were  negative  and  these  tend  to  correlate  with  individuals  having  
issues  with  regards  to  the  quality  of  the  work.    
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The  comments  for  this  question,  where  positive,  indicated  that  issues  of  comfort,  quality  of  
finishes  and  issues  of  reduced  condensation  were  the  main  issues.  Negative  comments  
centred  on  quality  of  the  build  and  unresolved  remedial  issues  at  the  time  of  the  study.  
  
In  terms  of  the  main  benefit,  as  shown  in  Figure  15,  energy  efficiency  remained  the  most  
highly  rated  improvement  (40.3%).  What  is  interesting  about  the  responses  is  that  the  look  of  
the  property  became  the  second  most  important  issue  (28.7%),  something  that  was  not  
indicated  in  the  decision  making  process.  
  
  
Figure  15  –  Main  benefit  of  the  retrofit  
  
     





The  overall  findings  indicate  that,  while  for  the  vast  majority  of  individuals  the  retrofit  process  
was  a  good  experience,  there  are  still  issues  to  address.    
  
In  terms  of  communications  it  is  clear  that  direct  and  personal  contact  appears  to  be  the  
most  successful,  with  newer  channels,  such  as  social  media  making  little  impact.  It  is  also  
clear  that  the  sample  had  a  specific  interest  in  energy  efficiency,  which  may  have  led  to  a  
better  understanding  of  the  wider  process.  
  
In  terms  of  the  occupant  experience,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  some  work  to  do  around  
communications  with  the  client  and  after  care,  something  that  may  be  highlighted  in  the  
forthcoming  Every  Homes  Matters  Review.  If  work  is  to  be  undertaken  at  scale  in  the  city,  it  
does  seem  that  standards  of  client  care  and  communications,  which  while  good  in  many  
cases,  could  bear  review  and  development.  
  
It  should  be  noted  that  the  sample  is  skewed  towards  those  boroughs  that  had  active  local  
authority  engagement,  so  it  is  not  entirely  clear  as  to  the  experience  in  those  areas  that  had  
a  more  contractor  led  solution.  This  does  bear  further  more  detailed  analysis.  In  addition,  
follow  up  work  with  regards  to  living  with  retrofit  may  be  beneficial,  as  many  individuals  
interviewed  were  just  in  the  process  of  handing  over  or  had  recently  had  their  properties  
improved.  A  longer-­term  view  may  better  focus  on  the  benefits  of  living  with  the  changes  in  
their  property,  as  well  as  highlight  issues  that  may  not  have  materialised  for  the  occupants.  
  
The  study  was  undertaken  as  a  value  added  exercise  and  as  such,  this  has  limited  some  of  
the  detailed  analysis  that  may  be  undertaken.  However,  the  response  rate  does  give  a  good  
overview  of  experiences  and  outcomes.  It  is  clear  that  in  further  work  of  this  nature,  a  more  
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This  document  reports  on  a  non-­technical  study  of  the  Greater  Manchester  (GM)  Green  Deal  
for  Communities  (GDC)  programme  that  aimed  to  identify  process  issues  across  the  key  
actors  involved  and  to  understand  how  these  issues  impacted  upon  delivery,  in  order  to  
understand  the  nature  of  these  impacts.  Issues  of  concern  included  the  extent  of  retrofit  
delivered  and  the  occupant  experience  of  the  retrofit  process.  This  report  provides  a  high-­
level  summary  of  these  issues  and  puts  forward  a  set  of  lessons  learned  from  the  
programme  that  can  inform  the  future  delivery  of  retrofit  in  GM.  
  
After  outlining  the  methodology,  this  report  discusses  issues  arising  from  a  set  of  interviews.  
It  begins  with  the  national  and  local  contexts  and  then  looks  at  the  governance  structures  in  
place  for  the  programme.  It  moves  onto  programme  delivery,  including  recruiting  
householders,  particular  challenges  with  the  private  sector  housing  market,  the  shifting  
funding  context,  soft  measures,  demo  homes,  technical  challenges  and  data  issues.  It  then  
turns  to  the  householders,  considering  their  motivations  and  understanding  their  experiences  
of  the  retrofit  process.  After  consideration  of  some  wider  strategic  issues,  it  summarises  key  





With  70%  of  UK  building  stock  existing  in  2010  expected  to  still  be  in  use  in  2050,  strict  low-­
carbon  standards  for  new  build  cannot  in  themselves  meet  substantial  carbon  reduction  
ambitions  for  the  stock  as  a  whole.  Retrofitting  the  current  stock  is  therefore  an  essential  part  
of  a  mitigation  strategy.  ‘Sustainable  retrofit’  can  be  understood  as  the  process  of  upgrading  
building  fabric,  systems  or  controls  to  improve  the  energy  performance  of  homes  (Brown,  
Swan  and  Chahal  2014).  It  is  important  to  understand  this  as  a  socio-­technical  process  that  
involves  not  only  these  physical  elements  of  the  home,  but  also  a  range  of  ownerships  and  
tenures.  Its  implementation  is  also  likely  to  involve  construction  companies  and  local  
authorities.  
  
In  their  GDC  project,  GM  sought  to  engage  with  the  diversity  of  the  private  sector  housing  
market  (owner-­occupied  and  privately  rented  housing)  with  a  view  to  making  retrofit  an  
attractive  product  for  them.  This  built  upon  previous  experience  of  coordinating  retrofit  
schemes  in  the  conurbation  for  homeowners  and  private  rented  stock.  
  
  
Green  Deal  Communities  
  
In  2013  DECC  invited  local  authorities  to  apply  to  the  Green  Deal  Communities  fund.  This  
fund  aimed  to  ‘maximise  the  delivery  of  Green  Deal  Plans  across  whole  communities/streets  
including  to  hard  to  reach  sectors’  (DECC  2013).  Local  authorities  were  encouraged  to  put  
forward  ‘ambitious  and  innovative’  (DECC  2013)  proposals  to  deliver  Green  Deal  Plans  to  a  
large  number  of  properties  in  target  streets  and  areas.  The  plans  would  be  dependent  on  the  
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applicants  securing  additional  ECO  funding  to  complement  the  Green  Deal  and  on  the  
creativity  of  the  local  authorities  in  offering  local  incentives.  The  GM  authorities  submitted  a  
successful  combined  bid  to  this  scheme  to  continue  their  retrofit  work  and  to  work  with  three  
commercial  partners  across  all  ten  local  authorities.    
  
The  GM  programme  was  delivered  by  the  ten  local  authorities  with  three  commercial  
partners  –  Keepmoat,  Wates  and  Willmott  Dixon  –  and  their  subcontractors.  It  was  
coordinated  by  the  GM  Domestic  Retrofit  Programme  Board,  on  which  sit  local  authority  and  
GM  Combined  Authority  representatives  along  with  individuals  from  research  and  practice  in  
advisory  capacities.  The  scheme  consisted  of  an  extensive  programme  of  predominantly  
external  wall  insulation  (EWI)  retrofit  in  houses  along  with  ‘soft  measures’  in  others  –  defined  
by  a  list  of  other  permissible  measures  (see  Appendix  X).    
  
The  scheme  also  involved  a  set  of  demo  homes  and  mini  show  homes,  which  were  intended  
to  provide  prospective  customers  with  exemplars  of  what  was  possible  on  their  homes.  GM’s  
target  (set  by  DECC)  was  to  have  1,205  household  signups  by  30  September  2015.  By  this  
date,  1,242  GM  residents/households  had  signed  up  for  Green  Deal  Community  installations  
and  537  of  these  installations  had  been  completed.  As  of  the  end  of  February  2016  the  
programme  has  seen  over  1,070  installations,  of  which  800  have  been  EWI  and  the  
remainder  soft  measures.    
  
In  the  national  context,  GM’s  programme  can  therefore  be  seen  as  successful  as  GM  is  one  
of  only  three  conurbations  that  have  achieved  their  signup  targets  and  only  seven  that  have  
achieved  over  90%  of  their  targets.  As  of  December  2015  it  was  the  only  area  to  have  
achieved  82%  of  its  installations.  Nationally,  27  authorities  were  awarded  Green  Deal  
Community  funds,  with  19  going  forward  with  the  programme  and  the  remainder  returning  




The  research  comprises  a  qualitative  study  that  seeks  to  understand  issues  arising  through  
the  GDC  process  by  means  of  interviews  with  key  actors.  The  interviews  have  been  
transcribed  and  analysis  carried  out  using  a  grounded  approach  with  qualitative  analysis  
software.  This  is  an  established  technique  within  applied  settings  for  identifying  emerging  
themes  and  areas  of  disagreement  and  provides  a  thorough  approach  for  the  development  
of  themes  and  concepts  whilst  maintaining  a  transparent  audit  trail.    
  
The  data  collection  comprised  18  semi-­structured  qualitative  interviews:  
•   four  of  these  were  with  local  authority  staff;;  
•   one  was  with  a  staff  member  of  the  GM  Environment  Team;;  
•   two  were  with  GM  Domestic  Retrofit  Programme  Board  members;;  
•   three  represented  the  commercial  partners;;  
•   two  represented  companies  subcontracting  to  the  commercial  partners;;  
•   one  was  with  an  external  consultant  acting  as  a  technical  advisor  to  the  programme,  
particularly  in  the  early  stages,  having  been  contracted  by  the  University  of  Salford;;  
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•   two  were  with  members  of  staff  at  DECC  –  it  is  worth  noting  that  they  had  not  worked  
in  DECC  for  the  whole  of  the  programme;;  
•   three  were  with  private  householders  who  had  had  EWI  installed  on  their  homes,  but  
had  not  participated  in  the  demo  homes  element  of  the  programme,  two  of  whom  had  
paid  towards  the  works  on  their  homes,  and  one  had  received  the  improvements  for  
free.    
  
It  should  be  noted  that  the  three  interviewed  householders  reflect  a  very  limited  sample  of  
the  approximately  1,000  householders  who  received  improvements.  Rather  than  presenting  
a  representative  study,  therefore,  their  views  provide  indications  of  the  types  of  issues  that  
are  likely  to  have  arisen  across  the  participant  base.  The  three  householders  were  selected  
from  those  with  whom  staff  had  been  in  touch  in  a  telephone  survey  to  make  final  checks  
that  the  works  were  complete.  They  were  selected  to  give  a  range  of  viewpoints:  one  broadly  
happy  with  the  work,  one  with  some  concerns,  and  a  third  with  stronger  concerns.  Two  of  the  
residents  had  paid  towards  the  works  on  their  homes,  and  one  had  received  the  
improvements  for  free.  The  three  residents  fell  under  the  responsibility  of  two  of  the  three  
commercial  partners.  
  
Two  of  the  four  local  authorities  interviewed  had  some  of  their  own  funds  to  supplement  the  
GDC  money.  An  additional  local  authority,  which  had  comparatively  limited  funding  and  staff  
resources  to  commit  to  the  programme,  was  contacted  for  an  interview  but  was  unable  to  
participate.  
  
It  was  beyond  the  scope  of  the  study  to  interview  representatives  of  all  of  the  ten  GM  
boroughs.  A  selection  of  four  was  chosen  to  give  a  spread  of  allocated  commercial  partners  
and  experiences  in  consultation  with  the  GM  Domestic  Retrofit  Programme  Board.  
  
In  addition  to  the  interviews,  the  research  has  drawn  upon  available  documents  –  principally  





The  Greater  Manchester  Context  
  
To  some  extent,  GDC  can  be  seen  as  a  continuation  of  ongoing  work  in  GM,  both  as  a  
combined  authority  and  as  individual  local  authorities.  Programmes  such  as  ‘Get  Me  Toasty’,  
which  made  home  insulation  available,  and  ‘Green  Deal  Go  Early’,  which  worked  with  
owner-­occupiers  and  social  housing  to  carry  out  multi-­measure  retrofit,  provide  a  precedent  
and  mean  that  there  is  expertise  and  experience  at  GM  and  borough  level.  Local  authorities  
had  ongoing  schemes,  which,  as  discussed  further  below,  had  increasing  relevance  as  GDC  
progressed.  GM  also  has  a  climate  strategy  that  includes  recognition  of  the  inefficiency  of  
current  building  stock  and  the  importance  of  ‘Taking  the  economic  opportunity  to  be  a  leader  
in  this  fast-­growing  field  of  “green  retrofitting  construction”’  (GMCA  2011,  p  29).  One  
interviewee  summarised  this  situation,  arguing  that  GDC  was  ‘partly  to  assist  us  towards  our  
carbon  reduction  targets  and  to  assist  with  the  combating  of  fuel  poverty’.    




In  a  minority  of  cases  local  authorities  had  their  own  funding  programmes  and  were  able  to  
make  connections  with  GDC.  This  interviewee,  for  example,  explained  the  relationship  for  
their  local  authority:  ‘We  already  had  a  project  in  place,  so  we  tagged  it  onto  what  we  were  
already  doing.  The  GDC  offer  became  a  part  of  the  Warm  Homes  scheme’.    
  
  
The  National  Context  
  
Notwithstanding  this  continuity  with  existing  GM  activity,  GDC  reflected  particular  strategic  
aims  at  a  national  level.  DECC’s  original  primary  intention  related  to  the  Green  Deal  Finance  
(GDF)  programme  and  its  wish  to  further  test  and  boost  take-­up  in  the  owner-­occupier  
market.  The  emphasis  was  on  a  community-­  or  area-­based  approach,  which  in  this  context  
implies  a  coordinated  approach  with  groups  of  households  and  involving  local  authorities.  
One  interviewee  described  this  as  ‘testing  how  we  can  utilise  a  community-­based  approach  
to  figure  out  how  Green  Deal  Finance  could  potentially  work  in  the  private  housing  market’  
and  another  mentioned  the  importance  of  ‘normalising  retrofit  as  a  consumer  product’.  
Bearing  in  mind  that  national  construction  businesses  such  as  the  three  commercial  partners  
in  GDC  are  not  ‘household  names’  amongst  home  owners,  it  was  considered  prudent  to  
work  through  trusted  organisations  such  as  local  authorities  and  community  organisations.    
  
Interviewees alluded to a fluid national context, highlighting the challenges this presented to 
the project: ‘DECC were fairly insistent on doing it one way, then they moved the goalposts 
and changed it’. One example of this that was given was that targets and timescales changed 
at several points throughout the programme.  
  
This  was  seen  to  reflect  changing  personnel  and  changing  policy  priorities  at  DECC  and  also  
a  degree  of  learning  and  reflection.  The  original  emphasis  on  GDF,  for  example,  was  
challenged  and  ultimately  reduced,  and  the  legality  of  stipulating  one  method  of  finance  was  
questioned.  A  positive  side  of  this  was  that  it  enabled  the  GM  authorities  to  be  more  flexible  
with  their  approach,  because  the  local  authorities  had  expressed  concern  that  GDF  was  not  
an  appropriate  option  for  households  with  more  limited  income  and  capital:  it  meant  that  
‘when  DECC  were  allowing  us  to  be  a  bit  more  flexible  with  the  funding  we  were  able  to  
target  the  fuel-­poor  customers  with  the  Green  Deal  Communities  funding’.  There  was  some  
recognition  that  this  flexibility  reflected  learning  at  the  national  level:  ‘I  think  they  learnt  from  
[local  authorities]  and  some  others  must  have  requested  similar  things,  so  then  they  did  ask  
us  how  we  were  working  with  the  fuel-­poor  and  they  modelled  their  revised  criteria  around  
that’.  It  was,  however,  noted  that  the  delays  in  arriving  at  this  decision  were  frustrating  in  an  
already  tight  programme  and  local  authorities  reported  that  they  would  have  preferred  to  
have  this  direction  from  DECC  from  the  start.  
  
Other  elements  that  reportedly  changed  were  the  minimum  number  of  soft  measures  
allowed  per  house  and  the  emphasis  on  a  whole-­house  approach.  Interviewees  reported  that  
an  initial  focus  from  DECC  on  multiple  measures  per  house  to  achieve  deep  retrofit  seemed  
to  transition  into  pressure  for  the  number  of  households  signing  up,  i.e.  the  number  of  
houses  receiving  at  least  one  measure  rather  than  the  extent  of  retrofit  for  each  participant.  It  
was  implied  that  the  reality  of  the  budgets  and  targets  necessitated  this  approach:  ‘with  the  
money  that  we  had,  if  we  did  whole  house  we  would  not  hit  that  target’.  Alongside  these  
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changes  within  the  GDC  programme  there  were  changes  in  funding  regimes,  particularly  
ECO  and  GDF,  which  will  be  discussed  in  section  0.  
  
These  considerations,  and  the  changing  context,  are  important  not  only  in  understanding  the  
challenges  faced  in  delivering  the  programme  but  also  in  assessing  the  overall  level  of  
success  of  the  GM  programme.  Fundamentally,  as  several  of  the  interviewees  observed,  
there  was  very  low  interest  in  the  actual  GDF  offer  and  only  a  small  number  of  households  
signed  up  to  this.  As  discussed  below,  when  GDF  was  effectively  cancelled  by  national  
Government  in  July  2015  this  created  problems  for  those  who  were  in  the  process  of  
receiving  this.  However,  GM’s  GDC  programme  met  its  targets  for  householder  signups  
more  effectively  than  any  other  of  the  participating  UK  local  authorities.  As  a  partner  argued:  
‘in  terms  of  a  programme  to  get  solid-­wall  housing  in  Manchester  insulated,  it  was  an  
extremely  successful  programme’.  
  
The  national  context,  therefore,  both  in  terms  of  the  specific  aspects  of  the  Green  Deal  
programme  and  changing  Government  retrofit  policies  and  funding  regimes  created  
challenges  for  those  delivering  GDC  in  GM  and  meant  that  progress  was  relatively  slow  at  
the  start  of  the  programme  whilst  the  parameters  of  the  scheme  were  being  clarified.  The  
emphasis  of  the  programme  changed  in  the  early  stages  from  deeper  retrofit,  i.e.  a  multi-­
measures  approach,  to  a  focus  on  a  target  for  signups  and  installations,  which  centred  
around  EWI.  




Governance  and  Local  Authorities  
  
As  a  GM-­wide  programme,  GDC  required  careful  coordination  and  it  is  clear  that  the  spatial  
scale  and  multi-­agency  governance  and  delivery  structure  presented  challenges.  The  GDC  
programme  was  led  by  the  GM  Domestic  Retrofit  Programme  Board,  with  the  ten  local  
authorities  and  the  three  commercial  partners.  Although  the  programme  brought  funding  with  
it,  local  authority  interviewees  expressed  concern  about  the  uneven  nature  of  the  ‘offer’  to  
residents  across  GM,  as  authorities  had  different  amounts  of  staff  and  financial  resources  to  
support  the  programme.  One  of  the  commercial  partners  observed  this  interaction,  
commenting  positively  on  the  potential  for  information  exchange:  
We  had  ten  local  authorities,  all  at  different  levels  in  terms  of  knowledge,  in  terms  of  
different  staffing  and  in  terms  of  past  experience,  and  having  AGMA  there  helped  to  
level  it  out,  so  the  ones  that  didn't  know  what  to  do  could  learn  from  the  experienced  
ones  and  the  ones  that  had  already  done  it  in  a  big  way  could  learn  from  people  who  
had  done  it  in  a  different  way.  
A  board  member  recounted  that,  as  with  every  GM  project,  there  were  some  difficulties  in  
working  across  the  ten  authorities:  ‘there  is  always  a  tension  between  the  GM  team  and  the  
local  authorities,  our  role  is  to  try  and  support  and  engage  with  ten  local  authorities  and  you  
can’t  please  all  of  the  people  all  the  time’.  
  
Despite  the  cooperation  and  GM-­level  coordination,  it  was  not  possible  to  develop  a  unified  
offer  across  the  whole  conurbation  as  the  authorities  had  different  levels  of  staff  and  financial  
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resources  to  contribute.  Some  additional  funding  was  made  available  to  local  authorities,  but  
an  interviewee  recounted  that  little  of  this  was  taken  advantage  of.  
  
Those  authorities  that  were  better  equipped  to  quickly  identify  potential  signups  were  able  to  
get  more  of  the  resources.  An  interviewee  reflected  on  this:  ‘but  there’s  no  doubt  that  those  
local  authorities  that  had  additional  officer  time  to  help  identify  suitable  candidates  for  work  
got  the  majority,  not  doubt  about  it.  And  therefore,  conversely,  those  local  authorities  that  
didn’t  have  that  resource  had  less,  and  that’s  because  they  had  less  time  and  effort  to  put  in  
to  working  with  the  contractor  to  identify  suitable  households’.  One  local  authority  
interviewee,  for  example,  had  found  that  their  allocated  commercial  partner  was  being  
slower  than  expected  in  locating  suitable  properties  and  recruiting  householders,  yet  they  did  
not  have  the  capacity  to  step  in  and  help  out  with  this  ‘on  the  ground’,  whereas  they  were  
aware  of  other  local  authorities  being  able  to  do  that.  At  least  three  local  authorities  were  
able  to  offer  the  work  at  no  or  minimal  cost  to  the  householder  by  using  local  authority  capital  
funds  made  available  to  assist  fuel-­poor  residents  and  areas  with  a  large  proportion  of  
households  in  fuel  poverty.  
  
One  local  authority  interviewee  mentioned  that  the  expectation  to  attend  GM-­level  meetings  
for  the  programme  was  time-­consuming  and  made  them  feel  less  connected  to  the  project  
than  they  otherwise  might  have.  There  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  this  was  a  concern  
shared  by  other  local  authorities,  but  it  is  a  consideration  for  conurbation-­scale  programmes  





Before  plans  for  GDC  were  finalised,  a  framework  for  retrofit  in  GM  was  created  with  a  view  
to  simplifying  the  process  for  local  authorities  to  carry  out  household  improvements  and  to  
maximise  the  potential  to  apply  Green  Deal  and  ECO  funding  across  the  boroughs.  
Following  consultation  with  the  ten  local  authorities  and  the  three  commercial  partners,  each  
commercial  partner  was  allocated  a  set  of  boroughs  to  work  with.    
  
In  delivering  GDC,  the  commercial  partners  chose  to  subcontract  substantial  parts  of  the  
work,  including  resident  recruitment  and  installations.  Interviewees  were  divided  on  the  
ultimate  suitability  of  the  type  of  commercial  partner  contracted  for  the  programme.  Any  
concerns  must  of  course  be  understood  within  the  context  of  GM  meeting  its  targets  for  
signups  and  doing  so  more  successfully  than  other  areas.  Although  their  lack  of  experience  
of  the  private  housing  sector  may  prompt  criticism,  one  interviewee  reflected  that:  ‘in  fairness  
to  them  they’ve  actually  done  quite  well,  given  they’ve  got  no  experience  in  this  market  and  
working  in  this  way  and  it’s  not  profitable’).  
  
Views  on  the  choice  to  use  national-­scale  commercial  partners  for  the  programme  varied,  
and  can  be  grouped  into  two  camps.  On  the  one  hand,  the  extent  of  subcontracting  added  to  
costs,  eroded  transactional  transparency  and  arguably  exposed  the  lack  of  experience  of  the  
partners  in  the  private  housing  sector.    In  this  sense,  it  was  argued  by  one  interviewee,  an  
opportunity  was  missed  for  the  GM  authorities  to  work  directly  with  local  contractors  with  
more  experience  of  working  with  householders  and  therefore  build  local  capacity  and  supply  
chains.  On  the  other  hand,  a  programme  of  this  nature  required  a  degree  of  stability  and  risk  
minimisation,  which  could  be  provided  by  these  national  concerns:  ‘In  the  last  year  we’ve  
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seen  many  companies  that  perhaps  people  would  have  argued  we  should  have  gone  to  
directly  go  belly-­up.  From  a  risk  point  of  view  it  was  probably  the  right  decision’.  A  
commercial  partner  added  that  they  are  likely  better  placed  to  forward-­fund  such  work  with  
such  a  large  project.  
  
The  views  of  local  authority  interviewees  on  their  respective  partners  ranged  from  frustration  
at  experiences  of  delays  and  lack  of  communication,  and  a  feeling  that  they  were  simply  
paying  the  partner  a  management  fee  but  dealing  with  subcontractors,  to  a  more  positive  
sense  of  a  reasonably  constructive  working  relationship.  To  an  extent  these  are  typical  of  the  
challenges  faced  in  delivering  a  multi-­actor  programme  across  multiple  boroughs,  but  they  
do  indicate  that  there  were  times  when  the  governance  arrangement  and  the  ways  in  which  
the  framework  was  set  up  made  these  challenges  particularly  acute.  
  
One,  for  example,  described  a  process  of  having  to  put  pressure  on  their  allocated  partner  
as  work  was  not  progressing.  Another  felt  disconnected  and  this  made  this  process  
particularly  difficult  –  ‘you’re  too  far  removed  from  that  subcontractor  role  and  you  don’t  really  
know  exactly  what’s  gone  wrong’  –  and  also  noted  the  potential  for  conflicting  priorities  –  ‘a  
partner  is  going  to  add  on  costs  and  management  fees,  and  they  want  to  meet  their  own  
ECO  types.  Two  really  conflicting  priorities,  I  think.  It’s  never  worked’.    
  
There  were  two  specific  challenges  that  added  to  the  task  of  the  partners.  The  first  of  these  
was  changes  in  the  availability  of  ECO  funding  as  the  programme  started  compared  with  
when  the  partners  were  bidding  into  the  framework:  ‘when  these  companies  put  their  bids  in,  
ECO  was  good.  There  was  money  there  to  be  made;;  there  was  money  to  help  residents.  
Then,  suddenly,  overnight,  it  just  went.  So  these  partners  found  themselves  in  a  relationship  
where  there  is  not  a  very  great  national  incentive’.  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  availability  of  
additional  ECO  funding  was  a  written  expectation  in  the  GDC  funding  application  process  
(DECC  2013).  As  discussed  in  section  0,  this  directly  impacted  upon  householders  but  also  
‘damaged  confidence’  in  a  more  general  sense.  
  
The  second  issue  was  the  emphasis  in  engaging  with  the  private  housing  sector,  whereas  
the  partners’  experiences  of  retrofit  were  primarily  in  the  social  housing  sector.  This  more  
familiar  territory  would  have  had  a  range  of  benefits  including  economies  of  scale  in  working  
with  consistent  housing  types,  which  had  been  subject  to  consistent  programmes  of  work  
over  time,  and  working  with  a  limited  number  of  social  landlords  rather  than  a  multitude  of  
individual  householders  with  their  own  preferences  and  personal  financial  investments  in  
their  home.  The  implications  of  this  for  delivery  are  discussed  in  section  0.  
  
This  partner  was  open  about  the  nature  of  this  challenge:  ‘…  as  an  organisation  we  don’t  
traditionally  deliver  solely  in  private  housing.  So  when  you’re  working  with  a  social  housing  
provider  you  know  the  number  of  properties.  You  get  given  the  addresses  and  all  of  the  
details,  where[as]  this  became  a  B  to  C  [business  to  consumer]  role.  So  we  were  engaging  
with  individual  private  householders,  cold  calling,  door-­knocking…’.  
  
There  is  some  disagreement  about  the  extent  to  which  this  was  clear  at  the  start  of  the  
programme.  This  may  be  a  result  of  the  partners  entering  the  process  as  the  framework  was  
being  developed  rather  than  when  GDC  itself  started,  as  this  partner  interviewee  implies:  
‘…  my  understanding  was  that  when  we  were  initially  engaged  it  was  primarily  to  deliver  
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social  housing  but  also  to  deliver  in  private  households,  but  with  the  Green  Deal  
Communities  funding  it  became  a  purely  private  household  scheme’.  
  
It  is  also  the  case,  as  one  interviewee  stated,  that  the  managers  who  tendered  for  
involvement  in  the  programme  were  not  the  same  people  who  were  tasked  with  its  
implementation.  They  suggested  that  during  their  experience  of  liaising  with  the  commercial  
partners  they  found  evidence  of  a  lack  of  systematic  briefing  and  training  among  the  
businesses  and,  in  turn,  their  subcontractors.  Local  authority  interviewees  recalled  feeling  
that  the  partners  had  not  fully  grasped  this,  mentioning  that  the  private  housing  had  been  







Identifying  and  recruiting  householders  to  take  part  in  the  scheme  proved  extremely  
challenging.  Whilst  some  interviewees  attributed  this  to  the  commercial  partners’  lack  of  
experience  and  preparation,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  this  was  also  a  relatively  difficult  area  for  the  
local  authorities.  Where  local  authorities  had  previous  experience  of  this  market  they  had  
found  it  extremely  challenging  and  in  some  cases  expertise  had  been  lost  as  staff  members  
had  moved  on.  The  interviews  gave  the  impression  of  a  fairly  ad  hoc  and  experimental  
approach  to  householder  recruitment  and  several  of  the  interviewees  directly  allude  to  this.  A  
board  member  reflected  on  this:  ‘The  understanding  of  the  process  I  think  was  not  good  
either  from  GM’s  side  or  from  the  contractors’  side  and  they  were  trying  all  sorts  of  different  
things  because  actually  neither  one  had  really  experienced  dealing  with  the  owner-­occupier  
market  in  this  way  before’.  
  
The  GM  Energy  Advice  Service,  a  phone  line  for  enquiries  on  home  improvements  and  
energy  efficiency,  was  seen  as  an  important  recruiting  tool  initially,  although  it  was  
disbanded  early  on  in  the  programme.  However,  the  interviewees  described  more  targeted  
measures  such  as  door-­knocking  and  leafleting  approaches  to  recruitment.  One  partner  
expressed  concern  that  a  conurbation-­wide  advice  line  was  not  necessarily  the  most  suitable  
approach:  ‘The  problem  is  that  you’ve  got  people  ringing  in  from  all  over  [Greater]  
Manchester  wanting  different  insulation  measures  doing  to  the  properties.  The  volume  of  
calls  that  we  would  get  became  unmanageable.  Also  it  doesn’t  allow  effective  delivery  
because  it’s  very  random.  You  don’t  get  clusters  of  properties’.  Additionally,  some  individual  
local  authorities  were  able  to  draw  on  their  own  databases  of  householders  who  had  
expressed  interest  in  energy  efficiency  improvements.  
  
Interviewees  identified  two  factors  that  made  the  recruitment  process  particularly  
challenging.  Firstly,  householders  had  become  accustomed  to  receiving  insulation  measures  
for  free,  whereas  GDC  often  involved  a  contribution  from  them.  This  pitted  energy  efficiency  
improvements  directly  against  other  home  improvements.  Local  authorities  and  partners  
alike  expressed  scepticism  about  residents’  propensity  to  engage:  ‘“You’ve  got  to  pay  for  
this”;;  they’re  looking  and  thinking,  well,  do  I  want  a  new  kitchen  or  a  new  bathroom  or  do  I  
want  my  cavity  insulated’;;  ‘They’re  not  going  to  start  putting  their  own  money,  which  they  
haven’t  got  anyway,  into  energy  efficiency  measures’.  
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Secondly,  and  related,  was  the  past  record  of  jobs  reportedly  carried  out  to  low  standards  by  
companies  operating  on  the  basis  of  previous  government  funding:  ‘So  shoddy  jobs,  a  lot  of  
jobs  not  done,  a  lot  of  instances  where  they’ve  been  happy  to  just  take  the  survey  fee  and  
run  away.  All  sorts  of  stuff’s  gone  on,  so  knocking  on  the  door  is  just  another  set  of  people  
knocking  on  my  door  with  the  same  old  tripe’.    
  
In  mitigating  these,  the  relationship  with  the  local  authorities  was  important,  with  local  
government  appearing  to  be  a  known  quantity  in  a  way  that  the  commercial  partners  were  
not.  Partners  who  were  speaking  directly  to  residents  were  able  to  benefit  from  the  credibility  
of  the  local  authority  involvement:  ‘I  think  it  does  work  that  you’ve  got  the  trusted  body  as  the  
council  knocking  on  the  door…  I  think  people  are  so  wary  now  with  people  knocking…  I  think  
we’ve  lost  a  lot  of  public  faith  in  energy  efficiency  measures  with  people  knocking  on  the  
door’.  ‘The  fact  that  I  could  reference  the  local  authority  and  the  local  authority  would  have  
resources  there  within  24  hours  or  would  be  able  to  call  within  24  hours,  that  made  my  job  
much  more  straightforward’.  
  
Conversely,  when  previous  retrofit  work  had  been  well  carried  out  and  had  been  positively  
received,  this  had  a  positive  effect.  Some  areas  had  had  EWI  schemes  before  on  social  
housing  properties  and  owner-­occupier  neighbours  were  able  to  see:  ‘we  had  neighbours  
living  next  door  who  could  talk  to  a  next  door  neighbour  and  find  out…  the  benefits  of  having  
EWI;;  how  much  warmer  the  home  was,  how  much  cheaper  it  was  to  run’.  Once  installations  
were  started  and  residents  saw  the  improvements  to  their  neighbours’  homes,  this  helped  to  
build  momentum  in  signups  and  increased  the  interest  in  communities.  This  local  authority  
interviewee  recounted  a  call  from  an  elected  member  that  evidenced  the  extent  of  interest  in  
the  community  –  ‘I’ve  been  out  walking  round  my  area;;  I’ve  got  a  list  of  the  solid  wall  block  
for  you’  –  and  residents  phoning  ‘You’ve  done  that  block,  when  are  you  doing  mine?’.  
  
Local  authority  connections  with  householders  were  useful  in  building  momentum,  as  this  
local  authority  interviewee  describes:  'Oh,  I'm  glad  you've  signed  up  now,  we're  still  
struggling  a  bit  with  Mrs  Jones.'  'Mrs  Jones?  I  know  Edna,  I'll  go  and  see  her.'  'Can't  get  the  
guy  at  number  16,  he  won't  talk  to  us,  he  won't  come  to  the  door,  it's  his  wife  all  the  time.'  
'Oh,  I  know  Abdul,  hang  on,'  then  the  mobile  phone  comes  out.  'Abdul,  what  you  doing?  
Come  down  here  now,'  and  so  building  up  those  contacts  and  getting  it  rolling  like  that.  
  
A  further  issue,  particularly  earlier  on  in  the  programme,  was  the  number  of  potentially  
competing  funding  streams  and  organisations  trying  to  promote  them.  The  Home  
Improvement  Fund,  for  example,  was  ‘very  confusing  for  people’  and  it  ‘used  to  turn  up  and  
then  disappear’,  doing  this  several  times  during  GDC.  This  local  authority  interviewee  
described  how  the  GDC  partner  was  targeting  the  same  estates,  because  it  was  clear  which  
estates  would  benefit  from  the  work:  ‘They  were  knocking  on  the  same  doors  and  residents  
were  just  getting  so  confused,  because  they  were  getting  sometimes  canvassed  off  three  or  
four  companies…’.    
  
Additionally,  the  interviews  suggest  what  could  be  described  as  a  ‘false  start’  for  resident  
recruitment  in  some  areas  and  it  was  felt  that  this  reflected  the  changing  context  created  by  
DECC  and  the  operational  possibility  of  the  programme  becoming  clear,  in  particular  in  
terms  of  what  the  partners  would  be  able  to  deliver  with  the  allocated  budget  and  time  
available.    
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With  the  initial  focus  on  GDF,  for  example,  one  local  authority  interviewee  explained  that  
they  initially  looked  towards  areas  of  more  affluent  householders  in  an  area  with  a  lot  of  
stone-­walled  properties  with  hard-­to-­treat  cavities  for  which  local  authority  grants  had  not  
previously  been  available  –  ‘GDC  was  initially  meant  for  people  who  were…  able  to  
contribute  to  the  measures’.  Their  view  was  that  it  became  clear  that  ‘half  the  partners  
weren’t  able  to  tackle  individual  requests  and  such  individual  house  types’  and  that  ‘the  
programme  wasn’t  able  to  deal  with  that  for  various  technical  and  management  reasons’.  
  
In  a  second  case,  the  local  authority  had  put  time  and  effort  into  locating  suitable  homes  in  
the  initial  stages,  but  their  allocated  commercial  partner  had  been  unreceptive.  The  local  
authority  had  organised  recruitment  events  but  stated  in  the  interview  that  the  contractor  had  
not  followed  them  up.  Following  difficulties  in  getting  traction  with  the  partner  and  further  
delays  in  seeing  the  appointment  of  a  subcontractor,  they  felt  there  was  no  longer  time  to  be  
able  to  follow  up  with  these  individual  households.  The  authority  was  able  to  make  the  
scheme  work  in  another  area,  which  implied  that  the  delays  limited  their  ability  to  be  strategic  
in  their  choice  of  housing:  ‘[it]  wasn’t  first  choice  as  far  as  I  was  concerned  but  it  was  a  case  
of  if  we’re  going  to  try  and  deliver  something  it  was  an  obvious  hit’.  
  
Private  Sector  Housing  
  
As  mentioned  in  section  0,  a  particularly  challenging  element  of  the  programme  was  working  
with  the  private  sector.  Public  sector-­coordinated  installations  of  EWI  in  GM  have  been  
primarily  in  the  social  housing  sector,  and  this  work  with  owner-­occupiers  therefore  
presented  challenges  across  the  different  organisations  involved.  For  the  commercial  
partners,  this  created  a  relationship  fundamentally  different  from  the  more  familiar  social  
housing,  a  business-­to-­consumer  rather  than  a  business-­to-­business  relationship  with  
multiple  household  contact  points  rather  than  a  more  limited  number  of  social  housing  
providers,  and  with  preferences  dictated  by  individual  tastes  and  budgets  rather  than  a  
registered  provider’s  business  strategy.  As  this  local  authority  interviewee  said:  ‘…the  
general  public  are  difficult  to  deal  with. Swapping  and  changing  their  mind,  not  
understanding  what  they're  getting,  whereas  when  you're  dealing  with  a  social  landlord  
you're  actually  dealing  with  a  social  landlord,  not  individuals…’.  
  
The  economies  of  scale  in  working  with  social  housing  stem  from  the  likely  proximity  of  the  
properties,  the  consistency  of  the  measures  being  applied  and  therefore  the  materials  and  
skills  needed,  and  the  condition  of  the  homes.  Local  authority  and  partner  interviewees  
remarked  on  the  inconsistency  of  the  quality  of  homes  in  the  private  sector:  where  walls  
were  in  poor  condition,  for  example,  it  was  not  appropriate  to  add  EWI  without  treating  them  
in  some  way;;  where  boilers  were  old  or  non-­standard,  it  could  be  difficult  to  procure  the  
correct  flue  attachment.  In  social  housing,  it  is  much  more  likely  that  stock  has  been  invested  
in  over  time  and  consistently  maintained  and  refurbished,  therefore  making  the  task  of  
retrofit  more  straightforward  in  comparison.  
  
In  addition  to  these  technical  issues,  partners  gave  examples  of  householders  causing  
delays  in  the  process.  In  one  property,  a  conservatory  needed  to  be  removed  before  EWI  
could  be  added.  Although  the  householder  was  organising  this  themselves,  this  was  taking  
longer  than  expected  and  causing  delays,  and  therefore  adding  costs,  for  the  commercial  
partners.  In  several  cases,  delays  were  being  caused  by  householder  indecision,  whether  on  
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the  colour  of  the  EWI,  the  type  of  door,  or  whether  to  go  ahead  with  the  work  or  not,  all  of  
which  created  delays  and  added  to  costs.  
  
Whilst  it  would  be  expected  that  work  would  be  of  high  quality  in  both  social  and  private  
housing,  it  is  also  likely  that  the  private  sector  will  have  particular,  and  higher,  expectations  
of  the  work,  and  be  used  to  managing  the  renovation  and  maintenance  of  their  homes  and  
want  to  protect  their  investment.    
  
One  of  the  ways  in  which  partners  were  able  to  maximise  the  economies  of  scale  and  
therefore  have  some  of  the  benefits  of  a  social  housing  approach  was  by  aiming  for  a  street-­
by-­street  approach:  treating  sets  of  houses  close  to  each  other,  potentially  a  whole  street,  
rather  than  ‘pepper  potting’  the  selection  of  houses  across  a  larger  area.  Advantages  of  this  
approach  included  cost  savings  with  scaffolding,  delivery  and  storage  and  extended  to  wider  
socioeconomic  impacts  such  as  the  more  complete  improved  look  of  a  street  and  the  
implications  for  desirability,  house  prices  and  the  tendency  for  people  to  look  after  their  
properties.  It  was  recognised  by  one  local  authority  interviewee  to  amount  to  a  more  ‘notable  
change  in  the  area’.  Additionally,  it  aided  recruitment:  ‘If  you’ve  got  a  lot  on  one  street  and  
you  put  one  scaffold  up,  it’s  amazing  how  people  start  to  follow  what  you’ve  done’.  
  
There  are,  however,  a  number  of  challenges  in  following  this  approach.  One  is  the  range  of  
tenure  types  and  abilities  to  pay,  with  a  single  street  potentially  including  social  housing,  
owner-­occupiers  and  privately  rented  properties.  As  discussed  above,  they  are  also  likely  to  
be  in  varying  conditions  of  repair.  There  is  also  a  financial  risk  to  the  contractor,  because  if  a  
substantial  number  of  houses  do  not  sign  up  then  the  economies  of  scale  will  not  be  
enjoyed:  ‘we  took  a  calculated  risk  based  upon  our  experiences  elsewhere’.  
  
Impacts  of  the  Funding  Context  
  
Interviewees  commented  on  the  context  of  national  funding,  highlighting  the  potentially  
competing  sources  available  to  local  authorities  and  householders  and  the  fluctuating  nature  
of  the  funding  offer.  For  a  minority  of  cases  of  resident  recruitment,  this  had  a  direct  impact.  
  
In  one  area,  a  small  number  of  householders  were  part  way  through  the  application  process  
for  GDF,  with  their  retrofit  plans  having  been  decided  on  the  basis  of  the  finance  being  
available  and  interrupted  when  the  Government  ceased  GDF  in  July  2015.  In  most  of  these  
cases  it  was  possible  to  continue  with  the  work  by  using  a  local  authority  care-­and-­repair  
loan,  but  for  some  this  was  problematic  and  subject  to  delays  because  this  loan  had  stricter  
criteria  than  GDF.  
  
Interviewees  shared  some  frustration  with  ECO  and  its  unpredictable  nature.  In  addition  to  
the  usual  fluctuations,  changes  in  the  national  picture  meant  that  ECO  funding  was  more  
plentiful  when  the  bid  was  written  and  partnerships  were  formed  and  that  it  fell  when  the  
project  started  to  gain  momentum.  A  partner  explained  that  further  changes  had  a  direct  
effect  on  what  they  could  offer  residents  and  that  they  could  have  to  return  to  them  after  the  
work  had  been  costed  and  explain  that  the  cost  to  them  has  now  increased.    
  
Local  authorities  found  that  this  impacted  deliverability  –  ‘The  ECO  rates  went  down  
significantly,  among  other  things,  and  it  just  made  the  project  [more  difficult]’  –  and  some  
	   	   	   	  
34	  
	  
were  able  to  find  other  funds  to  make  up  shortfalls,  helped  by  increasing  flexibility  from  
DECC.    
  
Issues  with  the  unpredictability  of  ECO  funding  were  experienced  throughout  the  project.  
Late  in  2015,  one  of  the  partners  experienced  further  reductions  in  the  levels  of  ECO  funding  
offered  by  EDF  and  ‘returned’  their  allocation  to  GM  to  be  picked  up  by  a  different  partner  
that  was  able  to  access  sufficient  funding.  One  interviewee  commented  that  ECO  was  
always  difficult  and  contributed  to  a  culture  in  which  data  was  not  readily  shared:  ‘No  one  
every  felt  the  need  to  make  it  less  opaque.  There  was  something  weird  going  on  where  there  
was  some  benefit  to  secrecy  on  who  got  how  much  ECO,  which  seemed  to  me  to  be  totally  
counterproductive  and  makes  life  at  a  strategic  level  very  difficult.’  
  
Whilst  in  GDC  the  key  actors  were  able  to  take  a  flexible  approach  and  find  ways  to  top  up  
funding,  this  shifting  funding  context  had  implications  for  their  ability  to  plan  strategically,  
especially  if  aiming  for  a  multi-­measure  or  whole-­house  approach:  ‘I  think  it  is  a  major  issue  
is:  what  have  you  got?  You've  got  ECO,  Green  Deal,  HIF,  FIT,  RHI,  various  brands  of  ECO,  
Green  Deal  Communities  and  actually  there's  no  joining  up  and  coordination.  If  we  do  think  





The  idea  behind  the  demo  homes  concept  was  to  provide  real  examples  of  retrofitted  homes  
that  showed  prospective  customers  what  a  home  would  be  like  following  the  application  of  
multiple  measures.  In  reality,  fewer  demo  homes  were  completed  than  planned  –  seven  
across  GM  –  and  they  came  later  in  the  programme  than  planned,  meaning  they  weren’t  
able  to  act  as  exemplars  for  prospective  customers  within  the  timescale  of  GDC.  None  of  the  
householders  who  put  themselves  forward  for  demo  homes  were  interviewed  as  part  of  this  
research;;  however,  the  local  authorities,  commercial  partners  and  other  interviewees  were  
able  to  comment  on  the  process  and  in  some  cases  relay  the  concerns  of  the  participating  
householders.  
  
Despite  the  completion  of  seven  demo  homes,  there  was  some  dissatisfaction  with  the  
process,  reflecting  the  delays  in  completing  the  homes  and  the  customer  journey.  It  was  
recognised  that  the  householders  volunteering  their  homes  as  demo  homes  were  ‘really  
passionate  about  it  so  they’re  willing  to  wait  and  willing  to  be  guinea  pigs’  but  that  ‘the  
customer  journey  has  been  poor’.    
  
The  interviewees  suggested  that  there  was  a  combination  of  reasons  for  delays  in  
completing  the  demo  homes.  One  challenge  was  finding  volunteers  to  open  up  their  home,  
as  a  commercial  partner  reflected:  ‘you  wanted  to  have  the  right  person  looking  at  it  and  
looking  after  it  that  can  show  people  round;;  you  want  that  person  to  be  enthusiastic  about  
the  measures  and  keep  a  tidy  house’.  
  
Part  of  this  process  was  agreeing  the  spec  of  demo  homes  with  the  householders.  This  was  
complex,  with  home  owners  clearly  having  their  own  preferences  for  what  they  wanted  for  
their  home,  rather  than  simply  accepting  a  demo  home  concept  being  imposed  on  them.  A  
local  authority  interviewee  recalled  an  iterative  process  of  firming  up  plans  and  
specifications:  ‘residents  wanting  things  that  weren’t  technically  possible,  or  the  funding  not  
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being  able  to  cover  what  they  wanted,  or  the  partners  not  being  able  to  deliver  what  was  
wanted…’.  A  board  member  reflected  that  clearer  minimum  standards  might  have  helped:  
‘sometimes  the  show  homes,  particularly  with  the  more  expensive  show  homes  rather  than  
the  smaller  show  homes,  the  specification  was  so  high  and  it  was  so  variable  that  it  became  
difficult  to  secure  a  deal.  So  I  think  the  failure  there  was  more  about  setting  minimum  
standards  and  then  saying  to  the  householder,  “And  if  you  want  more  than  that  then  that's  
fine,  but  that's  part  of  a  separate  negotiation”.’  
  
Another  factor  appeared  to  be  some  disagreement  over  the  purpose  and  scope  of  the  demo  
homes,  and  this  needs  to  be  understood  within  the  context  of  a  lack  of  clarity  over  this  part  of  
the  programme:  ‘I  think  it  was  inadequately  clear  from  the  start  about  the  expectations  of  the  
show  homes.’  The  initial  guidance  from  DECC  pointed  towards  demo  homes  that  were  
ambitious,  yet  attainable:  ‘In  theory,  you  think  “demo  home,  wow;;  let’s  have  the  best  we  can  
have  it”.  But  that  is  not  what  DECC  wanted.  DECC  wanted  a  home  that  everybody  could  
have.  An  attainable  home’.  In  GM,  the  specification  for  the  demo  homes  was  decided  by  the  
GM  Domestic  Retrofit  Programme  Board,  the  University  of  Salford  and  Red,  with  the  latter  
two  organisations  providing  a  technical  advisory  role.  It  was  decided  that  GM  would  aim  for  a  
set  of  ambitious  demo  homes  that  could  demonstrate  deep  retrofit,  evidencing  substantial  
reductions  in  carbon  emissions  of  around  80%  and  featuring  multiple  retrofit  measures.  It  
was  felt  that  more  basic  demo  homes,  with  lesser  carbon  reduction  potential,  would  have  
less  value  on  an  ongoing  basis  in  GM’s  retrofit  activities,  because  the  area  already  had  an  
existing  evidence  base  of  retrofitted  homes.  
  
At  one  end  of  the  spectrum  of  views  was  the  importance  of  emphasising  achieving  large  
carbon  reductions  via  a  whole-­house  approach,  an  approach  that  demonstrated  the  
technical  potential  of  retrofit  to  contribute  towards  climate  mitigation.  One  interviewee,  an  
independent  consultant  who  acted  as  a  technical  consultant  for  the  project,  for  example,  felt  
strongly  that  the  programme  should  have  pushed  for  a  deeper  retrofit  approach,  with  80%  
carbon  reductions,  to  set  an  example  of  what  would  be  technically  achievable.  Others,  
however,  expressed  concerns  about  the  suitability  of  this  approach,  given  the  actual  GDC  
offer,  which  was  largely  EWI,  and  what  householders  could  afford  under  the  programme.  
The  tension,  then,  was  between  the  level  of  retrofit  that  is  technically  possible  and  what  is  
affordable  and  politically  possible.  Whilst  it  is  questionable,  however,  to  what  extent  technical  
possibility  can  be  viewed  independently  of  its  political  and  financial  context,  it  might  also  be  
argued  that  programmes  such  as  this  can  extend  the  horizons  of  that  context  by  creating  
political  acceptability.    
  
A  commercial  partner  questioned  the  appropriateness  of  the  more  ambitious  approach  that  
GM  started  out  with:  ‘My  personal  view,  and  I  think  it's  shared  by  other  people,  is  that  the  
specification  to  match  what  we  were  actually  going  to  do  in  the  communities,  they  were  put  
together  as  an  exemplar  project,  let's  be  honest,  which  doesn't  reflect  what  you  can  actually  
do  in  the  communities  with  the  amount  of  money  that's  available’.  A  local  authority  
interviewee  questioned  its  appropriateness  for  their  area:  ‘Show  homes  were  never  really  
going  to  work  for  us  in  their  original  form,  and  they  were  originally…  You  had  to  open  your  
house  twice  a  year  to  show  people  round  for,  I  think  it  was  a  two-­year  period,  and  there  are  
issues  about  the  amount  of  work  that  had  to  be  done  to  a  show  home,  and  the  contribution  
toward  that,  etc.  It  just  didn’t  fit  [in  this  borough]…’.  
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One  interviewee  had  been  involved  in  the  early  stages  of  the  project  in  an  advisory  capacity  
and  had  attempted  to  act  as  a  broker  between  the  customers  and  the  commercial  partners.  
This  role,  they  reported,  was  made  difficult  by  a  lack  of  transparency  from  the  partners  in  
terms  of  the  costs  of  the  works.  The  interviewee’s  intention  was  to  show  how  the  capital  
outlay  could  be  paid  back  with  savings  over  time,  but  this  was  not  possible  without  a  reliable  
estimate  of  the  actual  costs:  ‘if  you  don't  get  the  costs  you  can't  then  make  sure  that  the  
repayments  balance  against  the  savings’.  Their  view  was  that  this  made  it  more  difficult  to  
convince  and  enable  householders  to  invest  in  deep  retrofit  with  high  levels  of  carbon  
reduction,  e.g.  80%.  They  also  felt  that  householders  were  given  insufficient  information  
about  the  works  to  make  an  informed  decision  on  proceeding,  especially  as  they  were  
owner-­occupiers  with  a  personal  stake  in  their  home.  
  
This  interviewee  expressed  concern  that  early  specifications  for  demo  homes  provided  by  
the  commercial  partners  were,  in  their  opinion,  overpriced  and  argued  that  this  not  only  
made  the  offer  increasingly  unattractive  financially  to  householders  but  also  made  it  very  
difficult  to  make  energy  savings  stack  up  against  capital  outlay.  Whilst  some  interviewees  
suggested  that  these  high  prices  reflected  the  partners’  reluctance  to  work  on  the  demo  
homes,  it  must  also  be  understood  that  high-­specification  bespoke  works  were  not  the  
partners’  usual  business  model  and  were  therefore  likely  to  incur  higher  costs.    
  
Interviewees  spoke  of  difficulties  in  getting  progress  on  the  demo  homes  from  the  partners,  
and  some  hinted  that  they  perceived  a  degree  of  reluctance  among  the  partners  for  this  part  
of  the  programme:  ‘I  think  it’s  never  been  fully  clear,  from  the  start,  who  was  leading  on  the  
demo  homes  and  who  was  doing  what…  I  think  partly  it’s  to  do  with  the  partners  not  wanting  
to  do  them’.  
  
This  lack  of  progress  was  despite  pressure  being  put  on  the  partners:  ‘We  couldn’t  have  put  
more  pressure  on  the  contractors  to  get  the  show  homes  up  and  going.  I  was  in  meeting  with  
them  almost  month  after  month  where  we  were  saying  “What’s  happening  with  the  show  
homes?  And  where  are  you  with  these?”  And  it  just  seemed  to  take  an  inordinate  amount  of  
time’.  Interviewees  commented  on  an  apparent  lack  of  power  over  the  partners,  on  demo  
homes  in  particular,  one  feeling  that  ‘we  were  kind  of  working  on  the  good  graces  of  the  
contractors’  and  that  ‘the  contractors  are  running  a  business  and  actually  they  couldn’t  see  
the  business  purpose  for  doing  it’.  It  was  also  observed  that  as  the  project  progressed  the  
focus  was  increasingly  on  the  targets  for  EWI  signups  and  installations,  as  that  was  what  
DECC  was  ‘judging’  the  programmes  against,  and  this  further  detracted  from  the  demo  
homes.    
  
Given  this  context,  it  might  have  been  prudent  to  separate  the  supply  chain  for  the  demo  
homes  from  the  main  focus  on  wide-­scale  EWI  delivery,  as  this  interviewee  suggests:  ‘I  think  
some  of  the  issue  was  that  actually  it  would've  been  nice  to  use  a  different  supply  chain  
because  I  think  actually  the  supply  chain  we  had  for  the  main  programme  was  really  about  
mass  scale’.  
  
The  result  was  that,  although  some  demo  homes  were  completed,  there  were  fewer  than  
originally  intended  and,  coming  at  the  end  of  the  programme,  they  were  unable  to  act  as  
exemplars  that  could  help  boost  signups  during  the  timescale  of  the  programme:  ‘They're  not  
the  showpiece  of  our  project,  at  all.  They  were  meant  to  kick-­start  the  programme,  yet  
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they're  towards  the  end  of  the  programme’.  The  idea  that  the  demo  homes  could  be  ready  
quickly  at  the  start  of  a  relatively  short  programme  was  clearly  very  ambitious.    
  
One  interviewee  emphasised  this,  placing  the  demo  homes  within  a  longer  timescale,  
although  it  was  not  clear  whether  other  interviewees  shared  this  view:  ‘Several  people  
thought  that  the  show  homes  would  assist  with  the  first  year’s  programme.  It  was  
screamingly  obvious  that  they  wouldn’t  because  it  takes  too  long  to  procure  a  whole-­house  
retrofit,  get  it  actually  on  site,  get  it  built  and  get  some  data  back  from  it’.  It  is  possible,  
therefore,  to  see  the  demo  homes  as  part  of  the  longer-­term  development  of  retrofit  in  GM,  




In  the  GDC  programme,  soft  measures  referred  to  non-­EWI  installations  defined  by  the  list  in  
Appendix  X.  In  mid  2015,  it  was  noted  that  soft  measure  signups  had  been  slow,  with  36  
across  the  ten  boroughs  against  a  target  of  330,  divided  approximately  equally  between  the  
partners.  This  issue  was  discussed  at  the  board  meeting  and  it  was  felt  that  it  was  likely  that  
soft  measures  were  not  as  profitable  as  solid  wall  installation  and  so  partners  had  not  
prioritised  them,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  the  partners’  prices  for  soft  measures  were  likely  to  
be  uncompetitive,  as  they  were  working  through  subcontractors.  Concern  was  also  
expressed  that  there  had  already  been  many  offers  for  energy  efficiency  improvements  such  




It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study  to  evaluate  the  technical  performance  of  the  retrofitted  
buildings;;  however,  there  are  some  issues  arising  from  the  interviews  that  it  is  useful  to  
document.  This  board  member  explained  that  modelling  would  suggest  improvements,  but  
that  there  was  a  need  for  monitoring  to  be  sure  of  the  quality  of  the  work:  ‘I  don't  think  you  
can  assume  anything  until  you  measure  it.  You  can  have  a  look  at  the  models,  but  if  you  
took  a  sample  of  those  properties  and  monitor  them  and  see  that  they're  more  energy-­
efficient,  but  it's  more  complicated  than  that  because  if  they've  not  done  them  right  and  
they're  putting  in  defects  into  owner-­occupier  homes  there's  a  lot  of  other  issues  that  need  to  
be  thought  about’.    
  
As  discussed  above,  there  were  technical  challenges  arising  from  the  diverse  nature  of  the  
private  sector  housing  stock.  These  reflected  the  lack  of  consistency  in  the  quality  of  the  
properties,  with  homeowners  likely  to  have  maintained  their  homes  to  different  standards  
and  made  different  choices  about  technologies  such  as  boilers  and  insulation.    
  
One  interviewee  raised  concerns  about  a  further  systemic  issue,  reflecting  the  limitations  of  
an  approach  focused  on  single-­measure  installations.  This  made  it  difficult  to  ensure  
synergies  with  future  retrofit  work  between  measures  by  dealing  with  the  junctions:  ‘it’s  not  
so  much  that  you  can’t  go  back  and  do  it  later,  because  in  some  cases  you  can,  it’s  the  fact  
that  when  you  only  do  single  elements  at  a  time  you  don’t  address  the  junctions’.  An  
example  being  that  when  boilers  are  not  replaced  at  the  same  time  as  EWI  is  installed  
patches  are  left  on  the  walls  where  their  flues  are  extended.  They  saw  this  as  having  the  
potential  to  ‘embed  problems’  and  there  was  a  lack  of  details  from  the  contractor  about  how  
they  would  deal  with  the  junctions.  The  interviewee  argued  that  we  therefore  need  to  plan  as  
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if  it’s  a  whole-­house  approach,  even  if  the  individual  measures  are  in  effect  installed  
separately,  as  this  allows  for  consideration  of  junctions.  They  had  observed  issues  such  as  
overhanging  eaves  insulation  stopping  at  the  point  where  no  one  had  to  touch  the  guttering  
rather  than  dealing  with  the  cold  bridge,  not  insulating  the  window  reveals  and  therefore  
leaving  the  option  to  upgrade  the  windows,  and  not  being  able  to  come  back  to  cold  bridging  
because  the  EWI  would  have  to  be  disrupted.  
  
An  interviewee  also  raised  concerns  about  the  use  of  expanded  polystyrene  (EPS)  insulation  
and  the  implications  for  potential  damp  problems  in  the  medium  term.  These  were  also  
reportedly  raised  in  a  technical  workshop  as  part  of  the  project.  A  partner  responded  to  this  
issue,  noting  that  the  materials  were  adequate  for  the  job  and  that  the  choice  of  product  was  
limited  by  the  available  costs:  ‘the  materials  that  have  been  chosen  and  specified  have  all  
been  more  than  adequate  for  the  job.  They've  all  been  designed,  detailed  and  specified  in  
accordance  with  working  with  the  correct  substrates….’ 
  
  
Data  Sharing  and  Protection  
  
There  were  some  delays  in  getting  moving  with  the  project  that  were  attributable  to  data  
protection  and  establishing  an  agreement  around  data  protection.  This  was  particularly  acute  
when  information  about  potential  households  was  sourced  by  one  organisation,  e.g.  the  
energy  advice  service  or  one  of  the  partners,  and  needed  to  be  shared  with  another  of  the  
organisations  for  operational  and  tracking  reasons.  Interviewees  gave  the  impression  that  
they  thought  local  authorities  were  risk-­adverse  with  data,  but  also  that  they  accepted  that  
this  was  for  good  reasons:  ‘And  the  bureaucracy  that  surrounds  information  technology  
within  local  authorities,  largely  for  good  reason,  did  take  us  a  while  to  overcome’.    
  
Where  local  authorities  wanted  to  keep  track  of  what  was  happening  in  their  areas,  this  
created  difficulties:  ‘some  of  the  authorities  have  got  real  issues  with  this,  AGMA  not  being  
able  to  tell  us  what's  happening  in  our  areas.  It's  understandable  and  I  think  it's  something  
that's  been  trying  to  resolve  for  a  while,  in  terms  of  data  sharing,  but  they  never  seem  to  
crack  it...’.  
  
One  local  authority  interviewee  had  had  difficulty  in  ascertaining  whether  they  were  getting  
value  for  money  when  the  information  on  costings  and  delivery  was  so  opaque:  ‘I  wasn’t  
allowed  to  see  the  whole  detail  of  that  tender  submission,  and  I  didn’t  know  what  the  other  
two  partners  had  submitted.  Massive  problem  for  me  in  terms  of  determining  whether  the  
authority’s  getting  value  for  money  or  not’.  For  authorities  that  maintained  a  database  of  
retrofit  in  their  area,  data  opacity  was  particularly  problematic:  ‘over  the  years  there’s  been  
so  many  different  schemes,  they  updated  that  so  they  know  what  has  and  hasn’t  been  done.  
Then  AGMA  weren’t  allowed  to  tell  them  addresses  of  what’s  been  done  for  their  area…’.  
  
When  dealing  with  the  commercial  partners,  one  of  the  challenges  was  getting  them  to  
report  in  consistent  formats  and  to  maintain  their  records  with  the  board  so  that  a  full  
overview  of  progress  could  be  kept.  This  was  reportedly  something  that  impacted  upon  the  
duration  of  the  project.  The  competitive  nature  of  the  partners  may  have  meant  that  they  
were  more  guarded  when  it  came  to  sharing  data:  ‘Those  partners  are  largely  competitive,  
as  you’d  expect  for  commercial  reasons.  And  therefore  their  willingness  to  certainly  share  
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sensitive  information,  and  in  some  instances  I  would  argue  probably  cooperate,  you  know,  
there  was  a  tension  there’.  
  
  
Householder  Motivations  and  Experiences  
  
Householder  Motivations  
Three  participating  householders  were  interviewed  as  part  of  this  study.  They  had  all  had  
EWI  installed  and  one  had  opted  to  pay  additional  money  for  some  supplementary  
measures.  Their  motivations  ranged  from  improving  comfort  at  home  and  cutting  costs  on  
energy  bills  to  improving  the  look  of  their  home  –  ‘I  was  fed  up  with  it,  the  way  it  looked  
outside’  –  and  bringing  their  home  in  line  with  social  housing  properties  in  the  street  that  had  
already  had  similar  work  carried  out.  One  was  considering  selling  their  property  and  saw  the  
aesthetic  and  energy-­related  improvements  to  be  an  advantage  in  the  market:  ‘It's  supposed  
to  be  a  lot  easier  to  sell  them  because  it's  got  more  efficiency  rating,  because  all  the  houses  
now  that  you  buy  and  sell  have  to  have  an  efficiency  rating,  don't  they?’.  A  further  perceived  
advantage  was  lower  maintenance  requirements,  particularly  not  having  to  paint  the  outside  
of  the  house.  
  
All  three  had  found  out  about  the  opportunity  through  written  communication  from  their  local  
authority,  either  directly  or  through  neighbours.  One  had  previously  expressed  an  interest  
and  the  authority  appeared  to  be  following  up  on  this  request:  ‘we’d  asked  for  it  a  couple  of  
years  ago  and  they  said  they  weren’t  doing  the  grants’.    
  
Two  of  the  interviewees  paid  £3,500  and  £1,000,  respectively,  towards  the  works  and  one  
paid  nothing.  Each  of  the  interviewed  householders  said  that  the  low  capital  cost  to  them  
was  part  of  the  attraction  of  the  opportunity,  and  implied  or  stated  that  they  would  not  have  
gone  ahead  with  the  work  if  it  had  been  more  costly:  
‘It  would  have  been  a  job  we  could  not  have  done.  There’s  no  way  we’d  have  wanted  
to  start  paying  out  £8,000  now  at  our  age.  £1,000  is  different.  If  you  had  to  pay  the  full  
amount  out,  that’s  taking  a  chunk  out  of  what  you  need  for  other  things.’  
From  an  admittedly  very  small  sample,  the  interviews  indicate  that  the  work  was  not  seen  as  
a  financial  investment,  in  the  sense  of  calculating  a  payback  period  for  the  energy  savings  to  
balance  the  initial  outlay,  but  rather  something  that  made  sense  and  cost  a  relatively  nominal  
amount  of  money,  in  the  context  of  the  costs  of  household  improvements  –  capital  that  the  
householder  had  ready  to  invest  in  their  house.  This  has  implications  for  the  relevance  of  a  
GDF  finance  approach,  because  this  relies  on  the  householder  funding  the  capital  costs  via  
energy  savings  over  time.  
  
Resident  Experiences  of  Retrofit  
  
One  resident  reported  that  they  were  satisfied  with  the  work,  at  least  with  the  value  of  the  
amount  they  had  put  in,  rather  than  being  concerned  about  the  actual  amount  paid  by  the  
GDC:  ‘I  can’t  say  whether  they’ve  done  £8,000  worth  of  work…  All  I  can  say  is,  yes,  that  
£3,500  that  I’ve  had  done,  which  I’m  only  bothered  about,  right  it’s  good’.  
  
Another  expressed  concerns  about  the  attitude  of  the  contractor  towards  them,  given  that  
the  work  was  at  zero  cost  to  the  householder.  The  interviewee  paraphrased  the  reaction  of  
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the  contractor  when  they  raised  issue  with  the  quality  of  the  work:  ‘Well  you’re  having  it  done  
for  nothing…  The  job’s  not  costing  you  anything’.  They  responded  to  this  angrily:  ‘We’re  not  
renting  this  house,  this  is  not  a  private  association,  I’m  paying  a  mortgage  on  this  house…  if  
you  don’t  do  a  proper  job  I’m  going  to  have  to  pay  to  have  that  job  done  properly’.  The  
interviewee  reflected  on  this  situation,  recounting  that  other  houses  in  the  street  were  
maintained  by  the  council  or  a  housing  provider  and  having  thought  that  the  contractor  had  
assumed  their  house  was  the  same.    
  
One  of  the  residents  was  very  pleased  with  the  work  and  felt  that  it  had  not  been  ‘too  
disruptive’  (h1),  also  reflecting  that  their  neighbours  seemed  pleased  with  theirs.  However,  
the  other  two  raised  issues  with  the  length  of  time  the  works  took,  which  was  much  longer  
than  they  had  initially  been  told.  In  both  cases  scaffolding  had  been  up  longer  than  
expected,  reportedly  about  three  and  a  half  months  in  one  case,  and  one  householder  
expressed  dissatisfaction  with  the  security  aspect  –  ‘They  can  climb  up  the  scaffolding.  
There  was  ladders  up  to  it.  That’s  easy,  then,  for  them  to  burgle  your  house’  –  and  the  lack  
of  natural  light  coming  into  the  house  during  this  period.  They  commented  on  the  overall  
organisation  of  the  work,  which  seemed  poor:  not  being  able  to  plan  for  when  workers  were  
coming  and  having  difficulty  in  communicating  with  the  contractors.  
  
Two  of  the  interviewees  were  very  positive  about  the  quality  of  the  work  and  the  
workmanship,  with  one  emphasising  that  the  actual  workers  were  very  competent  and  polite  
and  that  their  issue  was  more  with  the  managerial  level.  However,  a  third  had  actively  raised  
issues  together  with  their  neighbours:  ‘We  were  not  100  per  cent  happy  with  what’s  gone  on  
about  the  job,  so  people  have  been  shouting  and  screaming  about  it,  you  see’).  To  an  
extent,  this  related  to  the  organisation  of  the  job:  ‘I  think  nearly  everybody  I’ve  spoken  to  
who’s  had  the  job  done  has  got  some  complaint  or  other  about  the  whole  process.  It  got  to  
the  point  where  one  person  could  be  working  one  day,  then  a  completely  different  person  
could  be  working  the  next.  They  were  just  putting  people  on;;  they  were  just  putting  bodies  on  
the  job,  so  it  just  wasn’t  working  right.  It  was  badly  organised’.  The  householder  raised  
several  issues  with  the  quality  of  the  work,  including  the  repositioning  of  hanging  baskets  
relative  to  the  location  of  the  battens  and  not  removing  rendering  before  adding  the  EWI.  
They  reported  that  they  had  had  to  repeatedly  complain  about  the  quality  of  work  in  order  to  
have  it  corrected  to  their  satisfaction.  
  
The  householders  agreed  that  it  was  too  early  to  be  able  to  recognise  any  savings  in  their  
utility  bills,  especially  as  it  had  been  a  relatively  mild  winter.  They  did,  however,  feel  that  the  
indications  were  that  it  had  been  worth  it  in  terms  of  both  aesthetics  and  thermal  comfort:  
It  wasn't  a  freezing  house  before…  but  it  does  feel  warmer,  especially  on  the  upstairs  
part  of  it.  
It's  not  been  a  good  experience,  I've  got  to  admit  that,  but  it's  worth  it  once  it's  done  
because  it  does  look  really  good,  the  house,  and  obviously  I  have  felt  the  difference  in  
the  heating,  not  having  to  have  the  heating  as  high.  
I  went  downstairs  and  I  could  feel  the  difference  because  it's  actually  throwing  a  lot  of  
the  heat  back  in,  that's  with  the  heat  staying  in  the  bedrooms.  In  that  respect,  I  think  it's  
working  but  I  can't  be  sure  because  of  the  actual  year  it  is,  because  we've  been  having  
a  very  mild  winter  so  far.  
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An  important  part  of  retrofit  is  the  information  provided  to  residents,  both  beforehand  and  
afterwards.  The  three  interviewed  residents  felt  that  the  nature  of  the  work  had  been  clearly  
explained  to  them;;  however,  two  did  indicate  that  they  were  dissatisfied  with  the  timescales  
and  felt  that  these  had  been  underestimated.  However,  they  did  not  recall  being  given  any  
advice  on  follow-­up.  
  
Such  advice  could,  for  example,  deal  with  any  maintenance  issues,  including  where  and  how  
to  affix  items  to  the  EWI.  However,  the  interviewed  commercial  partners  and  contractors  did  
claim  to  have  handover  packs  that  they  had  developed,  in  some  cases,  with  the  local  
authorities,  which  took  into  account  issues  like  ‘What  happens  in  five  years'  time  if  you  want  
to  put  up  a  hanging  basket?  How  are  you  going  to  make  sure  that  you  don't  damage  the  
external  wall  insulation  and  invalidate  the  warranty?’ Another  contractor  mentioned  a  
resident  liaison  process  in  which  a  full  handover  pack  was  delivered. This  partner  
interviewee  applied  these  principles  to  soft  measures,  e.g.  boilers: ‘If  it's  a  boiler,  obviously  
we  would  talk  them  through,  go  through  the  user  guide  and  they  have  the  option  to  ring  us  
afterwards  and  say,  “Look,  I  still  can't  get  my  head  around  this  timer  or  round  my  thermostat.  
Can  you  talk  to  me  again?”  Obviously,  we  do  that’. 
Strategic  Issues  
  
One  interviewee  expressed  frustration  that  the  programme  had  moved  away  from  the  model  
of  householders  investing  in  retrofit  and  covering  the  capital  cost  via  savings  on  energy  bills  
over  time:  with  the  original  intention  from  DECC  being  that  householders  would  make  a  
contribution  to  retrofit,  this  was  not  the  case  in  all  boroughs.  The  interviewee  claimed  that  
this  is  a  ‘central,  cultural  problem’,  that  it  is  assumed  that  ‘pay-­as-­you-­save’  is  no  longer  
possible  and  ‘they  just  assume  that  it’s  got  to  be  100  per  cent  funded,  or  that  there’ll  be  a  
contribution  that  is  so  small  that  you  don’t  need  to  quantify  the  repayments  against  it.’  Their  
argument  was  that  the  required  scale  of  change  to  meet  carbon  reduction  targets  means  that  
we  need  to  build  momentum  amongst  householders  and  not  rely  on  public  money:  ‘there's  
no  way  you  can  spend  the  kinds  of  money  we  need  to  be  spending  on  peoples'  homes  
without  expecting  some  [costs  to  be  offset  against]  payback’.    
  
They  saw  this  as  a  missed  opportunity,  arguing  that  to  get  household  retrofit  moving  it  is  
necessary  to  segment  the  market  and  work  with  the  Rogers  dissemination  curve,  i.e.  that  a  
small  number  of  innovators  and  early  adopters  will  believe  in  the  approach  and  be  prepared  
to  take  financial  risks  so  that,  over  time,  with  the  market  boosted  and  economies  of  scale  
setting  in,  an  early  majority  and  late  majority  will  take  it  up  and  make  it  commonplace.  Given  
the  small  resident  contributions,  their  argument  was  that:  ‘we  ended  up  in  a  situation  where  
someone’s  got  to  put  £2,000  in,  but  there’s  no  doubt  they’ll  easily  save  it,  rather  than  
properly  quantifying  it.’  The  interviewee  felt  that  this  had  been  a  missed  opportunity  for  GDC.    
  
However,  a  board  member  reflected  that  the  lack  of  emphasis  on  the  GDF  approach  may  
have  been  largely  down  to  experience  in  terms  of  the  difficulty  in  getting  take-­up: ‘And  we  
found  that  the  take-­up  within  the  public  was  generally  low.  They  joined  the  project  when  
Green  Deal  finance  fell  apart.  We  had  to  find  alternative  methods  to  fund  the  same  sorts  of  
initiatives’. 
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Certainly,  local  authority  interviewees  highlighted  the  importance  of  the  low  capital  cost  to  
householders  in  enabling  them  to  reach  out  to  residents  at  risk  of  fuel  poverty.  This,  another  
board  member  argued,  was  a  useful  contribution  in  itself:  ‘In  some  ways,  I  think  we've  
probably  assisted  the  more  vulnerable  because,  some  of  these  residents,  because  it's  hard  
to  treat  properties,  they'll  have  been  left  behind  for  so  many  years,  because,  obviously,  
initially,  it  was  loft  and  cavity.  So  I  think,  in  some  ways,  we've  really  gone  a  step  ahead.  
We've  progressed’. 
  
Although  the  GDC  programme,  then,  can  be  seen  to  have  had  the  potential  to  help  reduce  
the  risk  of  fuel  poverty,  this  did  not  necessarily  lead  to  the  wider  goals  of  developing  retrofit  
as  a  consumer  project.  If  this  is  the  goal,  then  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  those  low-­income  
households  at  risk  of  fuel  poverty  are  likely  to  be  able  to  afford  to  be  early  adopters  in  the  
Rogers  dissemination  curve.  On  reflection,  local  authorities  were  keen  to  integrate  the  
programme  with  their  existing  fuel  poverty  schemes  and  had  used  their  fuel  poverty-­related  
funding  to  make  this  possible,  and  this  may  have  been  a  factor  in  the  project’s  increasing  
focus  on  fuel  poverty  over  time.  
  
Two  interviewees  raised  the  issue  of  the  current  customs,  practices  and  expectations  within  
the  industry.  Despite  there  being  information  about  the  risks  of  EPS,  one  interviewee  
claimed,  it  is  still  accepted  practice  that  this  would  be  installed.  With  this  and  other  
measures,  they  wanted  to  see  GDC  challenge  and  raise  the  technical  standards  and  
recognised  that  briefings  like  the  technical  workshop  and  training  events  were  designed  to  
do  this  –  ‘Actually  what  we  were  trying  to  do  was  raise  the  level  of  debate  around  retrofit’  –  
as  was  the  technical  support  on  offer.  An  interviewee  wanted  to  see  more  commitment  from  
the  partners  to  raising  technical  standards  and  more  pressure  from  the  coordinators  on  them  
to  do  this:  ‘I  was  naive  enough  to  assume  that  as  there  was  a  quarter  of  a  million  pound  
technical  support  budget  in  the  Green  Deal  Communities  programme,  where  we  had  shown  
people  details  for  how  to  sort  this  out,  that  there  would  be  some  sincerity  from  the  
contractors  to  sort  it  out.  But  they're  all  hiding  round  the  fact  that  because  that's  how  
industry's  always  done  it,  they  can  carry  on  doing  it  that  way  and  it  won't  be  a  problem’.  A  
local  authority  interviewee  shared  these  concerns,  hinting  that  this  had  been  discussed  with  
their  equivalents  in  other  GM  authorities:  ‘There's  industry  standards,  isn't  there,  to  EWI  work  
and  obviously  the  partners  meet  those  standards,  but  I  think  it's  quite  widely  agreed  now  
across  AGMA  that  those  standards  aren't  high  enough.  There's  a  lot  of  things  that  can  go  
wrong  still  with  the  installation’.  
Key  Lessons  
This  study  has  focused  on  the  processes  behind  the  GDC  programme  in  GM  through  a  set  
of  interviews  with  key  stakeholders.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  study  to  gain  a  detailed  
understanding  of  the  technical  performance  of  the  retrofit  measures  or  to  robustly  evaluate  
resident  satisfaction.    
  
The  programme  has  seen  the  installation  of  EWI  in  a  large  number  of    households  in  GM  
with  relatively  little  outlay  from  residents.  It  has  met  its  targets  for  signups  and  installations  
and  GM  is  the  only  UK  participating  area  to  have  achieved  this.  It  has  also  produced  nine  
demo  homes  and  seven  mini  show  homes  and  seen  the  installation  of  408  soft  measures  
across  the  area.  It  has  also,  arguably,  built  capacity  in  both  the  public  sector  and  the  
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commercial  partners  to  engage  with  owner-­occupiers  on  retrofit,  which  could  help  inform  a  
further  programme  of  retrofit  in  the  future.    
  
Notwithstanding  these  successes,  it  appears  that  changes  in  the  national  context  shifted  the  
programme  from  some  of  its  original  goals  and  that  this  had  implications  for  the  extent  to  
which  it  was  able  to  move  retrofit  forward  as  a  policy  area.  As  the  focus  shifted  from  whole-­
house  retrofit  towards  a  programme  of  single  measures,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  
opportunity  was  not  taken  to  significantly  advance  understanding  and  experience  of  carrying  
out  multiple  retrofit  measures  in  owner-­occupied  households  and  to  developing  this  as  a  
consumer  product.  
  
The  loss  of  GDF  and  the  changing  emphasis  of  the  programme  away  from  paying  for  retrofit  
via  anticipated  energy  cost  savings  towards  a  largely  subsidised  programme  could  be  
considered  a  missed  opportunity  to  develop,  test  and  normalise  a  savings-­based  model  of  
financing  for  retrofit.  Whilst  the  original  DECC  bidding  documents  specified  that  the  retrofit  
measures  should  be  at  least  partly  funded  by  homeowners,  this  study  suggests  that  local  
authorities  being  able  to  ‘close  the  payment  gap’  was  a  major  factor  in  driving  signups.  
  
This  national  context  is  important  in  understanding  GM’s  experience.  Whilst  this  study  has  
identified  issues  locally,  there  is  little  to  suggest  that  these  issues  are  particular  to  GM.  Any  
large-­scale  retrofit  programme  is  likely  to  experience  challenges  with  governance  and  data  
and  to  have  to  bring  together  a  range  of  views,  aspirations  and  levels  of  preparedness  
across  different  local  authorities.  In  fact,  GM’s  prior  experience  of  retrofit  is  likely  to  have  
placed  it  in  a  strong  position  to  overcome  these  challenges.  The  other  challenges  faced  in  
this  programme  indicate  issues  with  the  national  context  rather  than  GM.  These  include  the  
shifting  national  funding  context,  changes  in  DECC’s  priorities,  expected  standards  in  the  UK  
retrofit  industry,  and  the  relative  inexperience  of  the  commercial  partners  in  the  owner-­
occupied  sector.    
  
Nevertheless,  the  programme  has  contributed  to  the  understanding  of  the  potential  for  
retrofit  in  conurbations  in  general  and  the  owner-­occupied  market  in  particular.  The  following  
points  summarise  key  lessons  that  can  inform  future  work  on  retrofit  in  this  context.  
  
Creating  a  market  for  retrofit  
•   The  programme  has  demonstrated  the  possibility  of  marketing  and  implementing  a  
programme  of  EWI  in  the  private  housing  sector  (owner-­occupiers  and  private  
landlords),  and  successfully  met  its  targets  for  signups.  It  suggests  that  the  financial  
offer  to  residents  was  sufficient,  in  that  it  was  attractive  to  enough  householders  to  
meet  the  targets.  From  this  study  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  if  it  was  necessary:  i.e.  
whether  householders  would  have  gone  ahead  with  the  retrofit  if  there  had  been  zero  
or  little  Government  financial  assistance  and  a  large  debt  for  the  individual.  However,  
the  interviewees  do  imply  that  the  ability  of  local  authorities  to  provide  funding  to  
‘close  the  gap’  via  their  own  funding  was  an  important  factor  in  driving  take-­up,  
particularly  amongst  those  households  believed  to  be  in  fuel  poverty.  
•   In  recruiting  homeowners  and  others  to  the  programme,  the  trusted  nature  of  the  
local  authorities  played  an  important  role,  particularly  given  the  lack  of  currency  of  the  
commercial  partners  in  this  sector.  
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•   Interviewed  householders  expressed  a  range  of  motivations  for  taking  advantage  of  
the  scheme  and  these  included  improving  home  comfort,  saving  money  on  bills,  
improving  the  look  of  the  house,  increasing  the  market  value  and  saleability  of  the  
property,  and  reducing  the  amount  of  maintenance  needed  on  the  outside  of  the  
house.  This  suggests  that  in  selling  the  idea  of  retrofit  local  authorities  need  not  focus  
solely  on  energy  savings.  
  
Programme  governance  
•   The  relatively  large  spatial  scale  and  multi-­actor  context  of  GDC  in  GM  created  
challenges.  One  local  authority  felt  distant  from  the  core  decision-­making  in  the  
programme  and  also  felt  that  its  residents  did  not  associate  closely  with  schemes  that  
were  branded  as  GM.  However,  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  this  experience  
was  representative  and  some  local  authorities  were  able  to  mitigate  this  by  linking  
their  GDC  activities  with  existing  local  programmes.  
•   Data  sharing  was  particularly  challenging,  resulting  in  delays  in  getting  started  with  
the  programme  and  in  cases  of  local  authorities  not  being  able  to  keep  track  of  which  
houses  were  being  treated  in  their  areas.  
•   Although  not  a  universal  concern,  interviewees  did  note  difficulties  in  working  with  the  
commercial  partners,  particularly  in  terms  of  consistent  reporting  and  generating  
momentum  with  the  demo  homes  and  soft  measures.  
•   Some  local  authority  interviewees  experienced  difficulties  in  sourcing  information  
about  progress  in  their  area,  including  what  works  were  being  carried  out  where.  
•   This  suggests  a  need  for  a  stronger  project  governance  regime  that  allows  for  greater  
transparency  between  coordinators,  local  authorities  and  commercial  partners  and  
makes  the  commercial  operators  more  accountable  to  the  government  bodies.  
  
Delivery  
•   The  private  housing  sector  presented  particular  challenges  to  the  commercial  
partners,  who  were  more  accustomed  to  operating  in  a  social  housing  environment,  
and  there  is  evidence  that  this  caused  delays  in  the  delivery  of  the  programme.  In  
particular,  this  market  involved  working  with  multiple  points  of  contact  and  signoff,  in  
comparison  with  work  on  multiple  homes  managed  by  a  single  social  housing  
provider.  Social  housing  is  more  likely  to  have  been  consistently  maintained  and  
repaired,  whereas  owner-­occupied  housing  will  display  a  range  of  conditions  and  
standards  that  can  present  particular  challenges  for  the  retrofit  task.  The  private  
sector  will  have  their  own  preferences  relating  to  their  house  and  these  may  change  
over  time.  Contractors  may  be  dependent  on  householders  to  make  good  aspects  of  
the  house  before  they  can  progress  work.  
•   Where  a  street-­by-­street  approach  was  achieved  this  evidenced  some  benefits.  To  
the  commercial  partners  these  included  economies  of  scale  relating  to  scaffolding,  
deliveries,  storage  and  staffing.  To  local  authorities  this  represented  an  approach  that  
maximised  the  positive  impact  on  the  street,  thereby  having  an  impact  on  house  
values,  quality  of  life,  and  tendencies  to  look  after  properties  over  and  above  the  sum  
of  its  parts.  This  approach  also  aided  recruitment,  as  neighbours  saw  the  works  
being  carried  out  in  their  street  and  the  benefits  spread  by  word  of  mouth.  
•   Issues  such  as  poor  scheduling,  delays  and  disruption  affected  householder  views  of  
the  retrofit  process  and  influenced  the  likelihood  of  them  recommending  such  an  
approach  to  a  friend  or  neighbour.  
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•   Householders  disliked  the  assumption  that  because  the  work  was  free  to  them  this  
somehow  reduced  the  need  for  high-­quality  work.  Even  in  purely  financial  terms  there  
is  still  a  cost  to  them  as  it  may  affect  the  condition  and  market  value  of  their  home.  
  
Funding  regimes  
•   The  shifting  national  context,  particularly  in  terms  of  the  evolving  programme  targets  
and  funding  regime,  can  be  understood  to  have  created  difficulties  and  delays.  
Conversely,  some  of  the  changes,  such  as  the  move  away  from  a  focus  on  GDF  and  
greater  flexibility  concerning  soft  measures,  seemed  to  respond  to  difficulties  faced  
by  participating  areas  and  provided  some  flexibility  that  helped  the  GM  programme  
progress.  
•   The  changing  funding  context,  particularly  the  withdrawal  of  GDF  and  changes  and  
instability  in  ECO,  was  particularly  problematic.  In  a  relatively  small  number  of  cases,  
these  changes  resulted  in  householders  being  unable  to  continue  with  their  retrofit.  
On  a  GM  scale,  changes  in  ECO  meant  the  commercial  partners  were  operating  on  




•   The  demo  homes  were  subject  to  particular  difficulties,  which  included  recruiting  
residents  and  securing  agreement  on  the  scope  of  the  work  and  extended  to  
challenges  in  estimating  the  potential  savings  from  the  work.  To  some  extent,  the  
experience  reveals  the  limitations  of  the  commercial  partners  in  delivering  standalone  
whole-­house  retrofit  in  this  way.  The  difficulties  may  also  reflected  some  
disagreement  amongst  the  key  actors  as  to  the  purpose  and  value  of  the  demo  
homes  and  this  may  have  resulted  in  limited  ‘buy-­in’  to  the  concept.  
  
Technical  standards  
•   Although  this  is  not  a  technical  study,  concerns  were  expressed  by  the  interviewees  
that  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  current  practice  and  expected  standards  in  the  
industry  and  best  practice  in  retrofit,  to  the  extent  that  national  standards  for  EWI  
may  be  inadequate  and  training  opportunities  for  local  installers  are  needed.  This,  
together  with  a  lack  of  attention  to  the  junction  points  with  potential  future  measures  
on  the  homes,  was  conceptualised  as  risking  ‘embedding  underperformance’.  
  
Strategy  
•   Although  part  of  the  aim  of  GDC  was  towards  normalising  retrofit  in  the  private  sector  
and  creating  a  market  for  it,  the  programme  became  focused  on  addressing  fuel  
poverty  amongst  owner-­occupiers  and  privately  renting  households,  with  some  local  
authorities  integrating  it  into  their  programmes  aimed  at  low-­income  households,  
arguably  detracting  from  some  of  the  original  DECC  objectives  for  GDC.  Whilst  this  is  
clearly  an  important  contribution,  it  highlights  the  different  strategic  ‘entry  points’  for  
work  on  retrofit  and  fuel  poverty.  If  reducing  carbon  emissions  is  the  primary  goal,  it  
may  be  that  efforts  should  be  targeted  on  wealthier  households,  who  are  arguably  
better  equipped,  financially,  to  be  early  adopters,  who  can  help  to  boost  the  market  in  
retrofit  and  ultimately  make  it  more  mainstream  and  affordable  for  a  wider  market.  
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Conversely,  using  public  funding  to  lift  households  out  of  fuel  poverty  is  important  
from  the  point  of  view  of  health  and  wellbeing  but  may  have  a  lesser  effect  on  the  
market  for  retrofit.  Both  carbon  reduction  and  fuel  poverty  are  important  aims  that  
demand  policy  attention,  and  both  require  substantial  improvements  in  the  building  
stock,  but  this  experience  does  suggest  that  the  short-­term  alleviation  of  fuel  poverty  
and  the  medium-­term  development  of  a  market  for  owner-­occupier  retrofit  are  less  
synergistic  than  is  often  assumed.  
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